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FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT OF POLICE REFORM 
Stephen Rushin* 
 
Congress passed 42 U.S.C. § 14141 in an effort to combat police 
misconduct and incentivize proactive reform in local law enforcement 
agencies.  The statute gives the U.S. Attorney General the power to initiate 
structural reform litigation against local police departments engaged in a 
pattern or practice of unconstitutional behavior.  While academics initially 
praised the law’s passage, many have since worried that the Department of 
Justice (DOJ) has not effectively administered the measure.  Little research 
has analyzed how the DOJ has used its authority to initiate structural 
police reform.  Using a combination of qualitative and quantitative 
methods, I fill this gap in the available literature by detailing the DOJ’s use 
of structural police reform over time.  I conclude that the DOJ has 
historically underenforced § 14141, due in part to resource limitations that 
prevent the agency from aggressively pursuing all reported cases of 
systemic misconduct.  I also show that the DOJ has unevenly enforced 
§ 14141 over time.  Changes in leadership and internal policies have 
influenced the DOJ’s use of structural police reform.  These changes 
affected both the breadth and depth of enforcement.  In some cases where 
systemic police misconduct did appear to exist, a phenomenon I refer to as 
“political spillover” deterred the DOJ from turning to structural police 
reform.  Based on these findings, I argue that the DOJ must adopt a more 
transparent internal case selection process that incentivizes proactive 
reform in local police agencies.  And given the resource limitations facing 
the DOJ in enforcing § 14141, I contend that state and national 
policymakers should seek alternative routes to increase the number of 
structural police reform cases.  Combined, these changes could ensure that 
structural police reform lives up to its potential as a transformative tool for 
combating police wrongdoing. 
  
 
*  Visiting Assistant Professor, University of Illinois College of Law.  Thank you to all of 
the interview participants who made this project possible.  Thank you to Samuel Walker, 
Kami Chavis Simmons, Rachel Harmon, and Joshua Chanin for taking the time to speak 
with me about their expertise on this topic.  I also owe a debt of gratitude to those who 
provided feedback on various parts of this Article, including Evan Lee, Jonathan Simon, 
Pamela Foohey, Arden Rowell, and Andrew Brighten.  Special thanks as well to all the 
participants at the third annual Yale Law School Doctoral Scholarship Conference who 
provided thoughts on an earlier draft of this Article. 
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INTRODUCTION 
For much of American history, courts and legislative bodies have fought 
against police misconduct by using minimally invasive regulatory tools, 
like evidentiary exclusion,1 criminal prosecution,2 and civil litigation.3  
 
 1. See generally Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (mandating the exclusion of 
evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment by a state law enforcement officer). 
 2. 18 U.S.C. § 242 (2012) (making it a federal crime for a law enforcement officer to 
violate a person’s constitutional rights and providing stiff penalties for violations that result 
in bodily injury or death); Barbara E. Armacost, Organizational Culture and Police 
Misconduct, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 453, 464–65 (2003) (describing methods to hold law 
enforcement officers criminally liable for constitutional violations); Debra Livingston, 
Police Reform and the Department of Justice:  An Essay on Accountability, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. 
REV.  817, 844 (1999) (“[C]riminal prosecution plays some role in holding officers 
accountable for acts of clear illegality.”). 
 3. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006); Monell v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 
(1978) (establishing that a § 1983 claimant could sometimes recover from a government 
agency based on the actions of an employee from that department); see also City of Canton 
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Around the end of the twentieth century, a growing number of legal 
academics agreed that these existing regulatory mechanisms were 
insufficient.4  These measures cannot force local police departments to 
adopt reforms aimed at curbing misconduct.  Instead, these traditional 
regulatory tools only incentivize reform by raising the cost of 
unconstitutional behavior.5  By the early 1990s, a series of highly 
publicized incidents of police brutality showcased the inadequacy of these 
traditional misconduct regulations and spurred renewed calls for federal 
action.6 
In 1994, in an effort to address the need for mandatory reform in 
American police departments, Congress passed 42 U.S.C. § 14141 as part 
of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 19947 
(VCCLEA).  The statute makes it unlawful for a police agency to engage in 
a pattern or practice of unconstitutional misconduct.8  The statute gives the 
U.S. Attorney General the authority to seek injunctive or equitable relief to 
force police agencies to accept reforms aimed at curbing misconduct.9  The 
law seeks to reduce police misconduct in local police agencies in two 
distinct ways.  First, the statute aims to forcefully transform organizational 
 
v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385–88 (1989) (extending Monell and explaining that a state agent 
employer may be liable for the actions of an employee if the municipality’s policy or 
practice was deliberately indifferent to the likelihood that a constitutional violation would 
happen). 
 4. Although discussed in more detail later in the Article, I will mention two noteworthy 
examples here.  Over the years, the courts have gradually chipped away at the exclusionary 
rule. See Carol S. Steiker, Counter-revolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure?  Two 
Audiences, Two Answers, 94 MICH. L. REV.  2466, 2504–27 (1996) (explaining in detail the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s gradual recognition of various exceptions to the exclusionary rule).  
Prosecutors have shown hesitance in prosecuting police officers. See Rachel A. Harmon, 
Promoting Civil Rights Through Proactive Policing Reform, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1, 9 (2009) 
(“As a result, prosecutions against police officers are too rare to deter misconduct.”); see 
also Livingston, supra note 2, at 844 n.138 (arguing that criminal prosecution only 
represents condemnation for the most egregious behavior and mentioning the high standard 
of proof and cumbersome procedural requirements for criminal prosecution). 
 5. See infra Part I.B (explaining how traditional mechanisms are cost raising—that is 
they incentivize reform by increasing the cost of noncompliance). 
 6. Perhaps the most prominent instance of police brutality that spurred congressional 
action was the beating of Rodney King.  Soon after the King beating, the House 
Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights held hearings on police brutality—
specifically on the root causes of the King incident.  The individuals who testified at this 
hearing made various recommendations on how structural police reform may be an effective 
way to deter systemic misconduct. See generally Police Brutality:  Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 
(1991) [hereinafter Police Brutality Hearing]. 
 7. Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 210401, 108 Stat. 1796, 2071. 
 8. 42 U.S.C. § 14141(a) (“It shall be unlawful for any governmental authority . . . to 
engage in a pattern or practice of conduct by law enforcement officers . . . that deprives 
persons of rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution . . . .”). 
 9. Id. § 14141(b) (“Whenever the Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe 
[that there is a pattern or practice of misconduct] . . . the Attorney General . . . may in a civil 
action obtain appropriate equitable and declaratory relief to eliminate the pattern or 
practice.”). 
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policies and procedures to ensure compliance with constitutional norms.10  
Second, the law encourages the widespread adoption of national standards 
through the mere threat of costly litigation and restructuring.11 
Academics have praised this sort of structural police reform as a vital 
new tool to prevent police wrongdoing.  Professor Barbara Armacost called 
it “perhaps the most promising legal mechanism” for reducing police 
misconduct.12  Professor William Stuntz suggested that this might be “more 
significant, in the long run, than Mapp v. Ohio, which mandated the 
exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment.”13  
But in recent years, enthusiasm for the legislation has waned, in part 
because of a prevailing belief that the DOJ has not effectively used 
structural police reform.14  This emerging view “attribute[s] the weakness 
of § 14141 enforcement to insufficient resources devoted to structural 
reform of police departments and the related absence of political 
commitment to § 14141 suits, especially on the part of the Bush 
Administration.”15  Professor Joshua Chanin has observed that “the Special 
Litigation Section, the arm of the DOJ charged with [initiating structural 
police reform], changed considerably after the elections of George W. Bush 
and Barack Obama.”16  With this “came subtle yet important changes in the 
way pattern or practice initiatives were developed and implemented.”17 
 
 10. Samuel Walker & Morgan Macdonald, An Alternative Remedy for Police 
Misconduct:  A Model State “Pattern or Practice” Statute, 19 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 479, 
479 (2009) (“[T]he purpose of such suits has been to effect organizational reforms designed 
to establish standards of accountability that will prevent such abuses from occurring in the 
future.”). 
 11. Livingston, supra note 2, at 845 (“[E]nforcement of Section 14141 may have the 
beneficial effect of further stimulating the articulation and dissemination of national 
standards governing core police managerial responsibilities.”). 
 12. Armacost, supra note 2, at 457. 
 13. William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 
505, 538–39 n.134 (2001). 
 14. Brandon Garrett, Remedying Racial Profiling, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 41, 
100–01 (2001) (stating that “the DOJ lacks the resources” to address problems like racial 
profiling as demonstrated by the “[f]ew consent decrees” that have resulted from § 14141); 
Myriam E. Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform Litigation:  Deputizing Private Citizens in 
the Enforcement of Civil Rights, 100 COLUM. L. REV.  1384, 1407–11 (2000) (arguing that 
the small number of cases pushed forward by the DOJ via § 14141 are potentially the result 
of resource and political constraints); John C. Jeffries, Jr. & George A. Rutherglen, 
Structural Reform Revisited, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1387, 1419 (2007) (arguing “that the 
Department of Justice faces financial and political constraints on its effectiveness” in 
implementing § 14141); Kami Chavis Simmons, The Politics of Policing:  Ensuring 
Stakeholder Collaboration in the Federal Reform of Local Law Enforcement Agencies, 98 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 489, 493 (2008) (“Citing the expediency and cost-effectiveness of 
their settlement strategy, U.S. government officials have expressly articulated a preference 
for avoiding litigation and negotiating with municipalities to ensure compliance with the 
suggested reforms.”). 
 15. Harmon, supra note 4, at 21. 
 16. Joshua M. Chanin, Negotiated Justice?  The Legal, Administrative, and Policy 
Implications of “Pattern or Practice” Police Misconduct Reform 335 (July 6, 2011) 
(unpublished Ph.D dissertation, American University), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/
pdffiles1/nij/grants/237957.pdf. 
 17. Id. 
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Since § 14141 gives the attorney general sole authority to initiate 
structural police reform, the DOJ has become a critical gatekeeper.  This 
raises many important questions.  How has the DOJ exercised this authority 
as the gatekeeper of structural police reform?  Has the DOJ more eagerly 
used structural police reform during the Clinton and Obama 
Administrations than it did during the Bush Administration?  Have 
Republican attorneys general used less invasive forms of structural police 
reform than Democratic attorneys general?  And what does this mean for 
the future of police misconduct regulation?  Despite a significant amount of 
speculation on these subjects,18 little empirical work has sought to answer 
these questions.  If the DOJ has shifted enforcement policies dramatically 
from one presidential administration to another, this would suggest that 
structural police reform is an inconsistent tool for spreading constitutional 
policing practices in American police departments.  If the DOJ rarely 
exercises its statutory authority to bring pattern or practice litigation—
because of either political pressure or budgetary constraints—then structural 
police reform may not serve as a general deterrent to police misconduct.  
And if political pressures have made the DOJ less likely to negotiate 
settlements and demand external monitoring of problematic departments, 
structural police reform may not even serve as an effective tool to reform 
particularly problematic agencies. 
This Article presents the findings from an empirical examination of the 
structural police reform process.  It focuses on the DOJ’s role as the 
gatekeeper of structural police reform.  In doing so, it builds a descriptive 
account of how the DOJ has used its authority to initiate structural police 
reform under § 14141.  To do this, I obtained internal records detailing the 
various types of internal investigatory action that the DOJ has initiated 
since the law was passed in 1994.  This quantitative data offers insight into 
two important statistical trends in enforcement over the last twenty years.  
First, the DOJ has seemingly underenforced § 14141. The quantitative data 
suggests that the DOJ has initiated an average of three investigations of 
police departments pursuant to § 14141 per year.19  And the DOJ has only 
pursued full-scale structural police reform against an average of less than 
one department per year.20  Even if we assume that systemic misconduct is 
present in only a very small percentage of the nation’s roughly 18,000 
police agencies,21 the DOJ has only initiated § 14141 investigations against 
a fraction of problematic departments.  Second, the DOJ has enforced 
§ 14141 differently over time.  Between late 2004 and early 2009, the DOJ 
initiated few § 14141 investigations and did not pursue full-scale structural 
 
 18. See Armacost, supra note 2, at 513; Gilles, supra note 14, at 1419; Harmon, supra 
note 4, at 21; Simmons, supra note 14, at 519. 
 19. See infra Part III.B (outlining the breakdown of investigations and describing the 
number of investigations and full-scale structural reform cases). 
 20. Id. 
 21. BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CENSUS OF STATE AND LOCAL LAW 
ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES, 2008, at 2 (2011), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/
pub/pdf/csllea08.pdf (putting the number of state and local law enforcement agencies at 
17,985). 
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police reform against a single police agency.22  The number of open 
§ 14141 cases also declined over this time period.23 
To better understand the causes of these quantitative trends in 
enforcement, I completed thirty semistructured interviews with 
knowledgeable stakeholders in the structural police reform process.24  
Interviewees suggested that resource limitations prevented more aggressive 
and comprehensive enforcement of § 14141.25  Interviewees also attributed 
the variation in enforcement policies to changes in internal policies and 
enforcement preferences.26  Further, interviewees suggested that where 
systemic police misconduct did exist, a phenomenon I refer to as “political 
spillover” sometimes prevented the DOJ from turning to structural police 
reform.27  These realizations are further reminders that public rights of 
action are commonly subject to political cooptation and resource restraints, 
thereby limiting their potential effectiveness over time. 
Based on these descriptive observations, I make several normative 
recommendations to improve the effectiveness of structural police reform as 
a regulatory mechanism.  First, I argue that the DOJ should adopt a more 
transparent case selection process that incentivizes police agencies to 
reform proactively.  The qualitative data from this study suggests that the 
DOJ uses a wide range of methodologies to select a local police agency for 
§ 14141 litigation.28  No doubt, the DOJ has an enormous responsibility in 
identifying which of the nation’s 18,000 police agencies are engaged in a 
pattern or practice of unconstitutional misconduct.  And given the agency’s 
limited resources, the case selection process requires the DOJ to make 
tough choices.  The case selection process is messy, imprecise, and 
generally hidden from outsiders.  This makes it hard for police agencies to 
reform proactively. From the perspective of local municipalities, getting 
selected for structural police reform today is akin to winning a terrible 
lottery.29  Thus, I suggest that the DOJ develop a more publicly transparent 
case selection process that provides departments with incentives and 
opportunities to address patterns of misconduct. 
Second, given the apparent underenforcement of structural police reform 
in the United States, I contend that state and national policymakers should 
look for alternative ways to increase the number of structural police reform 
 
 22. See infra Figure 3.  The second term of the Bush Administration roughly matches up 
with this purported timeframe. 
 23. See infra Figure 4 (illustrating graphically this decline in open cases over this time 
period). 
 24. By and large, these interviewees requested anonymity given their continued role in 
this sensitive process.  As a result, this Article will refer to the interviews by an assigned 
number for identification purposes. 
 25. See infra notes 289–90 and accompanying text. 
 26. See infra notes 298–305 and accompanying text. 
 27. See infra Part III.C. 
 28. See infra Part III.A.1. 
 29. Eric Lichtblau, U.S. Low Profile in Big-City Police Probes Is Under Fire, L.A. 
TIMES, Mar. 17, 2000, at A1 (quoting Gary Durfour, former City Manager of Steubenville, 
Ohio, who wondered why the DOJ chose to investigate Steubenville when other departments 
appeared to have more significant problems). 
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cases.  One way to increase the number of structural police reform cases 
would be for Congress to reformulate § 14141 to grant private parties a 
limited equitable right of action to initiate structural police reform.  To 
prevent a private structural police reform claim from interfering with an 
active public claim, such a provision could also give the attorney general 
limited statutory authority to intervene and block a private claim if the DOJ 
has already initiated a public investigation pursuant to § 14141.  While such 
a reform would almost certainly increase the number of structural police 
reform cases and avoid issues of political spillover, it would be 
constitutionally tenuous and potentially lead to less rigorous reforms.30  
Conversely, another way to increase the number of structural reform cases 
would be for state legislatures to pass statutes that mirror § 14141 and give 
state attorneys general the authority to initiate structural police reform.  
Both of these normative proposals would permit the DOJ to continue the 
important job of structurally reforming a small number of problematic 
police departments, while empowering a new group of litigants to fill the 
gaps left by the DOJ’s limited enforcement. 
I have divided this Article into four Parts.  Part I details the history of 
police regulation, highlighting the inadequacies of these earlier methods of 
fighting misconduct.  Part II situates the emergence of § 14141 historically 
and summarizes the available research on the statute’s enforcement and 
effectiveness.  Part III builds a descriptive account of how the DOJ has 
interpreted and enforced § 14141.  This Part also describes the change in the 
use of structural police reform over time.  Based on these descriptive 
findings, I make several normative recommendations in Part IV. 
I.  HISTORICAL RESPONSES TO POLICE MISCONDUCT 
Policymakers did not come to view police misconduct as a widespread, 
national problem until the Wickersham Commission Report shed light on 
the pervasiveness of police wrongdoing.31  In the decades since, courts and 
 
 30. Harmon, supra note 4, at 60–62. 
 31. See, e.g., RICHARD A. LEO, POLICE INTERROGATION AND AMERICAN JUSTICE 70 
(2008) (“[T]he Wickersham Commission Report revealed that police brutality in general and 
the third degree in particular were practiced extensively and systematically in police 
departments across the country.”).  For a full record of the Wickersham Commission Report 
sections involving local police misconduct, including the Report on Lawlessness, see Samuel 
Walker, Records of the Committee on Official Lawlessness, in RECORDS OF THE 
WICKERSHAM COMMISSION ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, at v (1997), available 
at http://www.lexisnexis.com/documents/academic/upa_cis/1965_WickershamComm
Pt1.pdf.  In 1929, President Herbert Hoover appointed the National Commission on Law 
Observance and Enforcement.  George W. Wickersham, who served as the U.S. Attorney 
General under President William Howard Taft, chaired the commission. Id.  Prominent legal 
scholars and policymakers also sat on the commissions, including Harvard Law School Dean 
Roscoe Pound and former U.S. Secretary of War Newton D. Baker.  In total, the 
Wickersham Commission issued fourteen reports on a wide range of criminal justice issues.  
These reports were unique in part because they represented objective, technocratic 
approaches to understanding the problems plaguing the criminal justice system.  In 1931, the 
Wickersham Commission published the Report on Lawlessness in Law Enforcement, which 
some policing scholars have called “one of the most important events in the history of 
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legislatures have taken various steps to prevent police misconduct.  These 
actors have generally attempted to dissuade police wrongdoing by raising 
the potential costs of such behavior.  I call these previous efforts to limit 
misconduct “cost-raising misconduct regulations.”  These cost-raising 
misconduct regulations have almost certainly had some statistically 
significant effect on police wrongdoing, even if it is hard to accurately 
measure.32  Nevertheless, cost-raising misconduct regulations will always 
be of limited use.  To use the language of law and economics, a police 
department is generally free to engage in an efficient breach.33  That is to 
say, a police department may determine that the costs associated with a 
breach—generally monetary penalties or potential evidentiary exclusion—
are worth the benefits of violating the law.  Much like a contract, cost-
raising misconduct regulations give police the duty to follow the law or pay 
damages, whichever is preferable.  For example, imagine a city with a 
major crime epidemic.  That city may conclude that by encouraging officers 
to execute unjustified Terry stops,34 they can substantially reduce crime in 
certain high-crime neighborhoods.35  Such behavior would expose the city 
 
American policing.” Id. at v.  While many of the Commission’s reports had little immediate 
effect on public policy, the Report on Lawlessness in Law Enforcement did motivate major 
changes in policing policy.  The report claimed “in uncompromising language” that police at 
the time regularly used physical brutality and cruelty during interrogations to obtain 
involuntary confessions. Id. at ix.  Through a combination of participant and observation 
evidence, the report made an extremely strong case for major reform in American police 
departments.  While reform was not immediate, the Supreme Court did take a small step 
towards the judicial regulation of law enforcement the following year in Powell v. 
Alabama—the first case in which the Court reversed a conviction on the basis of a criminal 
procedure violation. See  Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).  Walter Pollak, one of the 
consultants who authored the Report on Lawlessness, argued the case before the Court. 
Walker, supra, at ix.  The justices in the Miranda decision cited the Wickersham 
Commission Report multiple times in explaining the long, documented history of police 
brutality and misconduct during interrogations. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445 n.5, 
447–48 (1966) (citing the Wickersham Commission Report as part of the evidence for 
abusive interrogation styles used at the time). 
 32. See infra notes 55–56, 77 and accompanying text (describing studies that show that 
some cost-raising misconduct regulations like the exclusionary rule and private civil 
litigation appear to incentivize departmental reform, thereby possibly reducing misconduct). 
 33. Robert L. Birmingham, Breach of Contract, Damage Measures, and Economic 
Efficiency, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 273, 284 (1970) (defining and explaining the concept of 
efficient breach in the context of contract law). 
 34. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (holding that a police officer may engage in a 
limited stop-and-frisk of an individual if the officer has a reasonable suspicion that a person 
is engaged in criminal behavior). 
 35. New York is a possible example of a city that has institutionalized the practice of 
regular Terry stops as a possible way to reduce crime.  A federal district judge held that the 
New York City Police Department was engaged in such an unconstitutional practice and has 
appointed a federal monitor to ensure changes in departmental policy. See Joseph Goldstein, 
Judge Rejects New York’s Stop-and-Frisk Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2013, at A1 
(detailing Judge Shira Scheindlin’s opinion finding that New York City acted 
unconstitutionally); J. David Goodman, Mayor Calls Court Monitor for Police a “Terrible 
Idea,” N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2013, at A22 (quoting Mayor Michael Bloomberg’s objection to 
judicial intervention in the city’s use of Terry stops as something that may increase crime); 
Adam Serwer & Jaeah Lee, Charts:  Are the NYPD’s Stop-and-Frisks Violating the 
Constitution?, MOTHER JONES (Apr. 29, 2013, 03:00 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/
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to civil litigation and evidentiary exclusion.  But the city may conclude that 
a cost is worth the potential benefit of reduced crime through deterrence.36  
Cost-raising misconduct regulations, therefore, may deter some but not all 
police wrongdoing.  In this Part, I examine the various legal remedies 
previously available in response to misconduct.  As I show, each previous 
regulatory method has serious limitations. 
A.  Exclusionary Rule 
The U.S. Supreme Court has attempted to remove the incentive for police 
to engage in misconduct by excluding from criminal court any evidence 
obtained by law enforcement in violation of the Constitution.  It took 
several decades for the Court to develop a robust exclusionary rule that 
extended to various types of law enforcement wrongdoing.  In the 1914 
case of Weeks v. United States,37 the Court first established a version of the 
exclusionary rule.  There, police entered the home of Fremont Weeks and 
seized papers and personal belongings without a warrant.38  The federal 
government used this illegally seized evidence to secure a conviction for 
transporting lottery tickets through the mail.39  In a unanimous decision, the 
Court held that the seizure directly violated Weeks’s Fourth Amendment 
right.40  But the Court went a step further and ruled that the government 
could not use the illegally obtained evidence as evidence against him at 
trial.41  Thus, Weeks represented the first application of the so-called 
exclusionary rule.42  The ruling was limited, though.  It only applied to the 
actions of federal law enforcement.43  Soon thereafter, in 1920, the 
Supreme Court further expanded the exclusionary rule in Silverthorne 
Lumber Co. v. United States.44  In that case, federal agents illegally seized 
tax books from Frederick Silverthorne, made copies of the records, and 
 
politics/2013/04/new-york-nypd-stop-frisk-lawsuit-trial-charts (illustrating the inequality of 
Terry stops in New York City). 
 36. See, e.g., Goodman, supra note 35 (quoting Mayor Bloomberg, who argues, in 
response to claims that these stops are unconstitutional, that Terry stops are an important part 
of crime fighting in New York City). 
 37. 232 U.S. 383 (1914), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
 38. Id. at 386–87 (explaining that the police had gone to the defendant’s house and 
entered the house unlawfully before taking “possession of various papers and articles found 
there”). 
 39. Id. at 389–90 (describing how the prosecutor used the papers at trial to show that the 
defendant had in his possession lottery tickets and statements in reference to a lottery). 
 40. Id. at 398 (“[T]he letters in question were taken from the house of the accused by an 
official of the United States, acting under color of his office, in direct violation of the 
constitutional rights of the defendant . . . .”). 
 41. Id. (“[I]n permitting . . . use [of the evidence] upon the trial, we think prejudicial 
error was committed.”). 
 42. See id.  Although the phrase “exclusionary rule” never appears in the Court’s 
opinion, the remedy may still be accurately described as such because it requires the trial 
court to decline to admit the illegally obtained papers into evidence. 
 43. Id. (stating that the Fourth Amendment can “reach the Federal Government and its 
agencies” but making no such claims about state government officials). 
 44. 251 U.S. 385 (1920). 
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attempted to introduce those copies at trial.45  The Supreme Court held that 
that even the copies of the illegally obtained evidence were illegally 
tainted.46  This precedent would be cited in the future as the “fruit of the 
poisonous tree” doctrine—an extension of the exclusionary rule that ruled 
as inadmissible both the illegally obtained evidence as well as any future 
evidence obtained as a result of the illegal action.47  Despite this initial 
judicial activism, it would be decades before the Court expanded the 
exclusionary rule to state law enforcement.  Since almost all American law 
enforcement work at the state level,48 this functionally meant that even after 
Weeks and Silverthorne, virtually all law enforcement could violate the rule 
without fear that their actions would inhibit a future criminal prosecution.  
The Court first had the opportunity to extend the exclusionary rule to the 
states in Wolf v. Colorado.49  In that case, Colorado had obtained evidence 
illegally—evidence that would have been inadmissible under the federal 
exclusionary rule established in Weeks.50  But the Court held that while the 
Fourth Amendment did apply to state law enforcement, the exclusionary 
rule did not.51  It would not be until Mapp v. Ohio that the Court changed 
direction.52  The Court in Mapp finally declared that “all evidence obtained 
. . . in violation of the Constitution is . . . inadmissible in a state court.”53  
Today, violations of the Fourth (unlawful search or seizure) and Fifth 
(failure to Mirandize a suspect) Amendments frequently lead to evidentiary 
exclusion in both state and federal courts.54 
 
 45. Id. at 390–91 (explaining the facts of the case, including how the United States 
marshal obtained books, papers, and documents illegally). 
 46. Id. at 391–92 (explaining the decision to bar the admission of the evidence at trial). 
 47. Id. at 392 (observing that any holding to the contrary would “reduce[] the Fourth 
Amendment to a form of words”). 
 48. See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CITY THAT BECAME SAFE 102 (2012) (describing the 
decentralization of American law enforcement into around 20,000 smaller state police 
agencies); see also REAVES, supra note 21, at 2 tbl.1. 
 49. 338 U.S. 25 (1949), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
 50. The Court started the opinion by bluntly stating the question: 
Does a conviction by a State court for a State offense deny the ‘due process of law’ 
required by the Fourteenth Amendment, solely because evidence that was 
admitted at the trial was obtained under circumstances which would have rendered 
it inadmissible in a prosecution for violation of a federal law in a court of the 
United States because there deemed to be an infraction of the Fourth Amendment 
as applied in Weeks v. United States? 
Id. at 25–26. 
 51. Id. at 33 (“[I]n a prosecution in a State court for a State crime the Fourteenth 
Amendment does not forbid the admission of evidence obtained by an unreasonable search 
and seizure.”). 
 52. Mapp, 367 U.S. 643 (holding that evidentiary exclusion is proper in cases where 
state law enforcement illegally obtain evidence). 
 53. Id. at 655. 
 54. See, e.g., NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, THE EFFECTS OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE:  A 
STUDY IN CALIFORNIA (1982) (finding that the use of the exclusionary rule led to prosecutors 
dropping complaints in 86,033 felony arrest cases). 
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Some studies show that judicial policymaking in the form of the 
exclusionary rule can instigate change in police departments.55  These 
studies find that police departments faced with the increased cost of 
evidentiary exclusion are sometimes more likely to punish officers engaged 
in wrongdoing, reward officers that obtain evidence legally, and choose not 
to promote officers that put cases in jeopardy by obtaining evidence 
illegally.56  But another strong current of research suggests that court efforts 
to alter police department behavior through the judicial decree have been of 
limited use.57 
The Court has also since carved out numerous exceptions to evidentiary 
exclusion58—the silver platter doctrine,59 the inevitable discovery 
doctrine,60 and the good faith exception,61 to name a few.  The exclusionary 
 
 55. See generally William C. Heffernan & Richard W. Lovely, Evaluating the Fourth 
Amendment Exclusionary Rule:  The Problem of Police Compliance with the Law, 24 U. 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 311 (1991); Myron W. Orfield, The Exclusionary Rule and Deterrence:  
An Empirical Study of Chicago Narcotics Officers, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1016 (1987). 
 56. See, e.g., Orfield, supra note 55, at 1018 (finding that the exclusionary rule had at 
least some positive effect on Chicago police by motivating reform and discouraging 
violations through policy changes and social norms). 
 57. Richard A. Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 266, 
302 (1995) (demonstrating how police have learned to negotiate the impact of Miranda, 
lessening the usefulness of warnings and increasing the likelihood of obtaining a 
confession); Richard A. Leo, The Impact of Miranda Revisited, 86 J. CRIM. LAW & 
CRIMINOLOGY 621, 621–92 (1996); see also GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE:  
CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (2d ed. 2008) (rejecting the role of courts in 
instigating social change in various contexts).  Gerald Rosenberg famously compiled 
evidence from numerous empirical studies demonstrating that attempts by the Court to 
instigate social change often fail. Id. at 324–31 (showing his skepticism particularly about 
the effectiveness of Miranda and the exclusionary rule).  By holding in Miranda that officers 
must read suspects a set of procedural rights, Chief Justice Earl Warren had two major 
concerns:  (1) police brutality during confessions and (2) psychological coercion that led to 
innocent people confessing to crimes they did not commit. Id. at 324.  But numerous studies 
after Miranda found that individuals were confessing and pleading guilty just as often as 
they had before the landmark decision. Id. at 325–26.  Further, Rosenberg argued that many 
departments still suffered from pervasive brutality. Id. at 326.  Police have also mediated the 
impact of judicial regulations.  For example, Charles Weisselberg has shown how police 
have found clever ways to limit the effects of Miranda warnings, while still avoiding 
evidentiary exclusion. Charles D. Weisselberg, Mourning Miranda, 96 CALIF. L. REV 1521, 
1523 (2008) (illustrating in impressive detail how police training material has taught law 
enforcement to mediate the impact of Miranda). 
 58. See Steiker, supra note 4, at 2504–27 (chronicling the Supreme Court’s gradual 
recognition of numerous exceptions to the exclusionary rule). 
 59. The Court rejected the so-called silver platter doctrine in 1960. Elkins v. United 
States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960) (holding that evidence is inadmissible in a federal criminal trial 
if it was obtained by state officers during a search that, if conducted by federal officers, 
would have violated the defendant’s protection from unreasonable searches and seizures).  
But since then, the Court has recognized a “collateral use exception” that seemingly 
“reconstitutes a version of what was once known as the ‘silver platter doctrine.’” David 
Gray, Meagan Cooper & David McAloon, The Supreme Court’s Contemporary Silver 
Platter Doctrine, 91 TEX. L. REV. 7, 10 (2012). 
 60. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984) (holding that law enforcement may use 
evidence obtained unlawfully so long as the material would have been inevitably discovered 
through another legal route in the process of the normal investigation). 
 61. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 919–20 (1984) (allowing prosecutors to admit 
evidence obtained illegally so long as the illegality was done in good faith). 
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rule is also “inevitably much narrower than the scope of illegal police 
misconduct.”62  This exclusionary rule was “designed [specifically] to deter 
police misconduct.”63  For example, misconduct by nonpolice officers 
generally does not trigger evidentiary exclusion.64  The exclusionary rule 
also only deters police misconduct that actually results in the collection of 
evidence.  This represents a small fraction of all misconduct.65  And 
ultimately, the exclusionary rule is merely a cost-raising regulation of 
misconduct.  If a police officer decides that it is more advantageous to risk 
evidentiary exclusion, he or she may rationally decide to violate the law.  
The exclusionary rule also comes at a high social cost.  As one 
commentator argued, the exclusionary rule “is an absurd rule through which 
manifestly dangerous criminals are let out because the courts prefer 
technicalities to truth.”66  The Court has also suggested that the need for the 
exclusionary rule may be waning.  In Hudson v. Michigan, the Court noted 
that significant improvements in the professionalism and training in 
American police departments may decrease the need for the exclusionary 
rule in the future—particularly given the high cost associated with 
excluding potentially incriminating evidence at trial.67  This has led many 
scholars to predict that the Court could someday move to overturn the core 
of the evidentiary exclusion principle.68 
B.  Private Civil Litigation 
Private civil litigation should, in theory, incentivize police agencies to 
adopt accountability measures.  Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, individuals can 
bring federal suit against state law enforcement agents that violate their 
constitutional rights.69  For most of the twentieth century, individuals 
 
 62. Harmon, supra note 4, at 11. 
 63. Leon, 468 U.S. at 916. 
 64. See Stephen Rushin, The Regulation of Private Police, 115 W. VA. L. REV. 159, 183 
(2013) (detailing the fact that the exclusionary rule only applies to public law enforcement); 
see also Leon, 468 U.S. at 916 (noting that “the exclusionary rule is designed [specifically] 
to deter police misconduct,” not misconduct by other actors such as judges or magistrates); 
Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 476 (1921) (distinguishing between the 
constitutionality of evidence obtained unlawfully by a state actor and a private actor). 
 65. Harmon, supra note 4, at 11 (stating that “the scope of the exclusionary rule is 
inevitably much narrower than the scope of illegal police misconduct” and arguing that 
“many kinds of misconduct” fall out of the scope of the exclusionary rule). 
 66. Guido Calabresi, The Exclusionary Rule, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 111, 111 
(2003). 
 67. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 599 (2006) (“[W]e now have increasing 
evidence that police forces across the United States take the constitutional rights of citizens 
seriously.”). 
 68. See generally Chris Blair, Hudson v. Michigan:  The Supreme Court Knocks and 
Announces the Demise of the Exclusionary Rule, 42 TULSA L. REV. 751 (2007); David Alan 
Sklansky, Not Your Father’s Police Department:  Making Sense of the New Demographics 
of Law Enforcement, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1209 (2006); James J. Tomkovicz, 
Hudson v. Michigan and the Future of Fourth Amendment Exclusion, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1819 
(2008). 
 69. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). 
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hoping to bring suit for police misconduct faced an uphill battle.70  Section 
1983 states that “[e]very person” who engages in a “deprivation of any 
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall 
be liable to the party injured in an action at law.”71  On its face, this seems 
to open up law enforcement officers and administrators to significant 
liability.  But because of a “misapplication of tort doctrine to constitutional 
adjudication,” the courts held for most of the last century that superiors 
were immune from liability for the actions of their employees.72  This 
meant that while a private person could file suit against an individual police 
officer in some cases, holding the police department or municipality 
responsible was nearly impossible.  The Court reaffirmed this holding in 
Monroe v. Pape.73  This default rule limited the potential for private 
individuals to obtain substantial financial compensation for civil rights 
violations, as individual officers rarely had significant resources.  Finally in 
1978, the Court held in Monell v. New York City Department of Social 
Services that a local municipality or department could be considered a 
“person” under § 1983 and thus held liable for the actions of their 
employees in some cases.74  Courts since Monell have held that in order to 
hold a municipality or department liable for the actions of an employee, the 
employer must have been deliberately indifferent in its failure to train or 
supervise an employee.75  Only in these narrow cases could plaintiffs reach 
the employer in civil litigation.  The Monell decision, no doubt, had 
important implications for American police departments.  After the case, 
aggrieved citizens could levy claims against both individual police officers 
and the police departments that employ them. 
Various rigorous examinations of this type of individual-initiated civil 
litigation against departments have yielded skepticism.  This method for 
regulating law enforcement misconduct “appears to be a weak strategy for 
achieving police reform, in part because of the structure of local 
governments and a pervasive pattern of political and administrative 
irresponsibility.”76  After all, civil litigation is a cost-raising regulation 
 
 70. This was largely because under Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), individuals 
could not hold a department or municipality liable for much of the twentieth century.  The 
Court in Monroe deemed superiors virtually immune from liability. Id. 
 71. The relevant portion of § 1983 reads: 
Every person who, under color of [law] . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any 
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the 
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and 
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other 
proper proceeding for redress . . . . 
42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
 72. Candace McCoy, Enforcement Workshop:  Lawsuits Against Police—What Impact 
Do They Really Have?, 20 CRIM. L. BULL. 49, 51–52 (1984). 
 73. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 191–92. 
 74. Monell v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 695–701 (1978). 
 75. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989) (explaining that a state agent 
employer may be liable for the actions of an employee under § 1983 if the employer’s policy 
or practice was deliberately indifferent to the likelihood that a constitutional violation would 
occur). 
 76. Walker & Macdonald, supra note 10, at 495. 
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tactic.  It only works if aggrieved parties regularly litigate and departments 
feel the financial consequences of this litigation, thus motivating them to 
change behaviors and policies.  At least one study has shown that civil 
litigation has raised the potential cost of misconduct high enough to force a 
response by local police agencies.77  Other evidence, though, suggests that 
decentralization in local municipality government makes legalized 
accountability difficult:  “[O]ne agency of the government, the police 
department, commits abuses of rights, another agency, the city attorney’s 
office, defends the conduct in court, and a third agency, the city treasurer, 
pays whatever financial settlement results from the litigation.”78  This 
means that while a police department may suffer from a lawsuit in response 
to officer misconduct, the department itself may not feel the financial 
ramifications of the lawsuit.  Such a finding suggests that private civil 
litigation does not necessarily increase the cost of misconduct, limiting the 
ability for this litigation to instigate widespread reform.  Further, a recent 
study by Professor Joanna Schwartz concluded that across virtually every 
major city in the United States, police departments indemnify officers 
facing § 1983 suits.79  As she concludes, 99.98 percent of all dollars paid 
via § 1983 litigation are paid by cities, departments, or municipalities—not 
individual officers.80  This means that, not only do cities keep departments 
from feeling the negative effects of litigation, but officers themselves rarely 
feel the financial consequences of misconduct.  In addition, individuals 
hoping to exercise their rights under § 1983 face high entrance barriers and 
legal fees.  The mobilization of legal protections under § 1983 is costly, 
making them only feasible in cases of serious misconduct.  So while it 
might make financial sense for a person to initiate a § 1983 suit where 
police misconduct leads to a wrongful death, a rational individual may 
choose not to use the statute in the event they are unlawfully stopped and 
frisked. 
C.  Criminal Culpability 
State and federal laws hold police officers criminally liable for certain 
acts of misconduct.  If a police officer commits an act of misconduct that 
rises to the level of a criminal offense, prosecutors can charge them with a 
crime like any other person.  A federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 242, provides 
some avenue for the DOJ to seek criminal convictions against police 
 
 77. CHARLES R. EPP, MAKING RIGHTS REAL:  ACTIVISTS, BUREAUCRATS, AND THE 
CREATION OF THE LEGALISTIC STATE 93–114 (2009) (describing the process by which police 
departments have come to implement reform, due in part to the threat of possible litigation).  
Epp shows that in November 1977, when the largest private insurance company that 
provided police liability insurance withdrew from the market because of unacceptable risk, 
the prospect of self-insurance motivated many police professionals to develop rules and 
regulations about police conduct. Id. at 95.  According to Epp, this contributed to a growing 
culture of “legalized accountability” in American police departments. Id. at 4. 
 78. Walker & Macdonald, supra note 10, at 495. 
 79. Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014). 
 80. Id. (manuscript at 1). 
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officers that abuse an individual’s civil rights.81  In the years leading up to 
the passage of § 14141, though, evidence emerged that the federal 
government lacked the resources to pursue § 242 prosecutions regularly.  
Figure 1 below shows the number of civil rights complaints received by the 
DOJ between 1981 and 1990 and the proportion of these complaints that 
resulted in investigations or criminal charges. 
FIGURE 1.  FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT OF 18 U.S.C. § 242 IN YEARS LEADING 
UP TO THE PASSAGE OF STRUCTURAL POLICE REFORM82 
Year Complaints Investigations Attempted 
Charges 
1981 11,064 30.6% 0.6% 
1982 10,327 31.2% 0.8% 
1983 10,457 31.2% 0.6% 
1984 8,617 39.6% 0.7% 
1985 9,044 32.8% 0.8% 
1986 7,546 37.0% 0.8% 
1987 7,348 38.5% 1.0% 
1988 7,603 38.0% 0.7% 
1989 8,053 39.5% 0.9% 
1990 7,960 38.3% 1.0% 
 
As the numbers demonstrate, the DOJ only had the resources to 
investigate a fraction of civil rights claims under § 242.  Moreover, the DOJ 
only sought criminal charges in less than 1 percent of the cases.  Among 
those cases where the DOJ actually went to trial on § 242 violations, 
acquittals were not uncommon.83  Indeed, in the years leading up to the 
passage of structural police reform, it became increasingly clear that federal 
 
 81. 18 U.S.C. § 242 (2012) (making it a federal crime for a police officer to violate a 
person’s constitutional rights and placing heavy criminal penalties on such behavior that 
leads to bodily injury); BONNIE MATHEWS & GLORIA IZUMI, U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, 
WHO IS GUARDING THE GUARDIANS?:  A REPORT ON POLICE PRACTICES (1981), available at 
http://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/007105152. 
 82. Police Brutality Hearing, supra note 6, at 10 (showing the number of civil rights 
prosecutions by year as compiled by the DOJ as part of a hearing on police brutality).  I 
calculated these numbers as follows.  To determine the percentage of complaints that 
resulted in investigations, I divided investigations by complaints received.  To determine the 
percentage of times the DOJ attempted to file criminal charges, I added together all times the 
DOJ presented a case to a grand jury or filed an information.  To calculate the percentage of 
convictions, I used the number of trial convictions and the number of guilty pleas. 
 83. Id. (showing that in some years, like 1988 and 1989, there were an equal or greater 
number of 18 U.S.C. § 242 acquittals than convictions). 
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prosecution was an ineffective means to punish officers engaged in 
wrongdoing.  These results are consistent with other past criticisms of 
criminal prosecutions at the state level.  As other authors have previously 
posited, juries frequently trust and sympathize with officers during criminal 
trials.84  Prosecutors are hesitant to bring criminal charges against police 
officers.85  And the scope of the criminal law is also invariably narrower 
than the scope of police wrongdoing.  A law enforcement officer may 
engage in numerous acts that violate the constitution, but do not rise to the 
level of a violation of the criminal law.  Although necessary and useful in 
some circumstances, criminal prosecution is an extremely limited tool for 
fighting police wrongdoing.86 
Other mechanisms for spreading best practices in law enforcement, like 
accreditation, also deserve some recognition,87 although accreditation’s 
usefulness is limited by the fact that it is voluntary and intermittently used 
by local police agencies across the country.88  Given the clear inadequacies 
of traditional approaches to regulating police misconduct, the next section 
chronicles historical attempts by litigants to initiate structural police reform 
via equitable remedies. 
D.  Previous Pushes for Structural Police Reform 
On two separate occasions in the late twentieth century, both private and 
public litigants sought equitable relief in civil lawsuits against local police 
agencies.  In both cases, courts found that the litigants lacked standing to 
pursue such nonmonetary relief absent a clear statutory authorization.  The 
first of these cases happened in 1979, when the DOJ filed a lawsuit against 
 
 84. See Armacost, supra note 2, at 464–65 (describing methods to hold law enforcement 
officers criminally liable for constitutional violations); Harmon, supra note 4, at 9 (noting 
that prosecutors generally fail to prosecute police and juries fail to convict); Livingston, 
supra note 2, at 844 (“[C]riminal prosecution plays some role in holding officers accountable 
for acts of clear illegality . . . .”). 
 85. Harmon, supra note 4, at 9 (explaining the hesitance on the part of the prosecutors to 
bring charges against police officers). 
 86. For another example of how criminal prosecution has been a limited tool for 
combating police misconduct, see John V. Jacobi, Prosecuting Police Misconduct, 2000 
WIS. L. REV. 789, 806–11 (discussing the limitations of federal criminal prosecution as a tool 
to fight misconduct). 
 87. Some have argued that the move towards accreditation and uniformity to national 
standards has made departments more receptive to shifting norms in policies and procedures. 
See Terry Gingerich & Gregory Russell, Accreditation and Community Policing:  Are They 
Neutral, Hostile, or Synergistic?  An Empirical Test Among Street Cops and Management 
Cops, 2 JUST. POL’Y J. 3, 7 (1996). 
 88. Id.  In 2010, there were 985 local police agencies accredited by the Commission on 
Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA). COMM’N ON ACCREDITATION FOR 
LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES, ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2010, at 3 (2011), available at 
http://www.calea.org/content/calea-2010-annual-report.  But accreditation is still voluntary 
and expensive.  Thus, it should come as no surprise that the 985 agencies claiming CALEA 
accreditation in 2010 represent only 5.6 percent of all law enforcement agencies in the 
country. See REAVES, supra note 21, at 2 (showing that there are approximately 17,985 local 
law enforcement agencies in the United States).  The vast majority of all departments have 
not taken the step to receive CALEA accreditation, making it a weak method for instilling 
widespread adoption of best practices as currently constructed. 
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the Philadelphia Police Department (PPD), alleging a pattern of police 
abuse that systemically violated residents’ constitutional rights.89  
According to the DOJ, the PPD maintained policies and procedures that 
actively thwarted the investigation and the disciplining of officers engaged 
in constitutional violations.90  The DOJ requested an injunction to stop the 
PPD from engaging in this kind of misconduct going forward.91  A federal 
district judge dismissed the claim, however, holding that the U.S. Attorney 
General had no standing to bring such lawsuits absent an explicit statutory 
grant of power from Congress.92  The DOJ appealed the decision, only to 
have the Third Circuit uphold the lower court’s dismissal.93  The assistant 
attorney general testified to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights that he 
and his colleagues knew they “were dealing with something that went 
beyond individual acts of misconduct. . . .  [They] were dealing with 
institutional problems.”94 
The DOJ had previously prosecuted six homicide detectives in 
Philadelphia for coercing confessions out of possibly innocent suspects.95  
Nonetheless, at least one of those convicted of coercing confessions out of 
criminal suspects actually received a promotion and support from City 
leadership.96  As one member of the DOJ elaborated:  “if an officer on the 
beat perceives that he or she is going to be shielded and protected by the 
institution from an investigation and from prosecutions . . . then I think 
what we have is a situation where even prosecuting individual officers is 
not going to change the environment.”97  Complaints aside, United States v. 
City of Philadelphia established the precedent that, absent Congressional 
 
 89. United States v. City of Phila., 644 F.2d 187, 190 (3rd Cir. 1980) (explaining at the 
appellate level that “[t]he government’s theory is that the appellees, the City of Philadelphia 
and numerous high-ranking officials of the City and its Police Department, have engaged in 
a pattern or practice of depriving persons of rights protected by the due process clause of the 
fourteenth amendment”). 
 90. Id. (stating that the DOJ alleges that “appellees discourage victims of abuse from 
complaining, suppress evidence that inculpates police officers, accept implausible 
explanations of abusive conduct, harass complainants and witnesses, prematurely terminate 
investigations, compile reports that justify police officers’ conduct regardless of actual 
circumstances, refuse to discipline police officers for known violations, and protect officers 
from outside investigations”). 
 91. Id. at 189 (identifying injunctive relief as the desired remedy). 
 92. United States v. City of Phila., 482 F. Supp. 1248, 1252 (E.D. Pa. 1979), aff’d, 644 
F.2d 187. 
 93. City of Phila., 644 F.2d at 206 (“We will hold the Attorney General to the same 
pleading requirements we demand of a private litigant who brings an action under the Civil 
Rights Acts.  The appellant failed to satisfy these standards, and it deliberately rejected an 
opportunity to amend its complaint.”). 
 94. MATHEWS & IZUMI, supra note 81, at 135. 
 95. Id. at 135–36. 
 96. Id. at 136 (“The mayor at the time, of Philadelphia, kept the officers on the force, 
promoted one of the men who had been convicted, and asserted they were innocent until 
proven guilty at the Supreme Court level.” (quoting The Federal Role in the Administration 
of Justice:  Hearing Before the U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights, 96th Cong. 117–19 (statement 
of Drew S. Days III, Assistant Att’y Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice)). 
 97. Id. at 135. 
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authorization, the DOJ did not have standing to initiate structural police 
reform via equitable relief. 
This rule did not sit well with many civil rights advocates.  In 1981, the 
U.S. Commission on Civil Rights identified City of Philadelphia as 
establishing a gap in the regulatory approach to police misconduct.98  The 
Commission recommended the adoption of legislation to remedy the 
judicial limitations placed on the use of structural police reform.99  The 
Commission observed that “the volume of complaints of police abuse 
received by the Commission has increased each year . . . and . . . [p]atterns 
of complaints appear to indicate institutional rather than individual 
problems.”100  The Commission also recognized that one of the best 
possible ways to address these institutional problems was through some 
type of structural reform litigation that would incentivize police 
departments to change their behavior.101  The Commission reached this 
conclusion in part because previous attempts to file for injunctive relief 
against American police departments had failed.102  With that in mind, the 
Commission recommended the enactment of pattern or practice litigation 
similar to § 14141, stating that “Congress should enact legislation 
specifically authorizing civil actions by the Attorney General of the United 
States against appropriate government and police department officials to 
enjoin proven patterns and practices of misconduct in a given 
department.”103  Thus, the Commission saw this proposed measure as a 
novel way to address systemic wrongdoing in police agencies.  
Nonetheless, the Commission did not offer model language, nor did it 
thoroughly expound on the proposal.  This novel proposal did not gain 
traction in Congress until the following decade. 
The DOJ was not the only plaintiff attempting to pursue structural police 
reform.  Private litigants also attempted to initiate such reform via equitable 
relief.  In 1976, Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) officers stopped 
Adolph Lyons for a traffic violation.104  Even though Lyons did not resist 
the officers, the officers nonetheless seized Lyons in a chokehold without 
any provocation.105  Lyons brought suit against the LAPD, asking in part 
for the court to enjoin the LAPD from using such chokeholds in the 
future.106  In a five-to-four decision, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that 
 
 98. Id. at 135–36 (identifying City of Philadelphia as the case that has limited DOJ 
authority to initiate structural police reform and outlining how this has potentially hampered 
DOJ involvement in police reform). 
 99. Id. at 134 (identifying the need for “federal litigation aimed at institutional 
misconduct” in cases where there is a demonstrated “pattern or practice of police abuse”). 
 100. Id. at vi. 
 101. Id. at 134–36 (detailing the potential usefulness of structural reform litigation). 
 102. Id. (explaining this failure and linking it to a need for reform). 
 103. Id. at 164–65. 
 104. City of L.A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 97 (1983) (identifying a traffic violation as the 
initial cause of the interaction with the plaintiff). 
 105. Id. at 97 (saying that Lyons did not resist the officers in any way, nor pose any threat 
before being put in a chokehold). 
 106. Id. at 99–100 (stating that, at the district level, an order was handed down enjoining 
the use of the tactic). 
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plaintiffs do not have standing to levy a claim for injunctive relief unless 
they can show a real, immediate, or continuing threat.107  Since Lyons was 
not in serious risk of being stopped and illegally choked by the LAPD in the 
future, he lacked such standing.108  Lyons could seek individual damages 
against the police and the city, but he could not seek injunctive relief.109 
After the Lyons and City of Philadelphia cases, there appeared to be no 
judicial remedy to force local police departments to adopt proactive reforms 
to prevent patterns of systemic misconduct.  This left a significant gap in 
the regulatory approach to local police departments.  As I detail in the next 
Part, by the early 1990s, several prominent examples of police 
misconduct—including the Rodney King incident in Los Angeles110—drew 
national attention to the inadequacies of the available misconduct 
regulations.  And by 1994, the stage was set for the introduction of a new 
regulatory approach. 
II.  THE ROAD TO STRUCTURAL POLICE REFORM 
Although civil rights advocates had recognized the importance of 
structural police reform for decades, it was not until the early 1990s that the 
issue rose to national importance.  This is in large part because of one single 
incident of appalling police brutality—the LAPD’s beating of Rodney 
King.111  This event almost immediately spurred congressional 
investigation into the scope of police misconduct problems in the United 
States.  Within weeks of the event, the House Subcommittee on Civil and 
Constitutional Rights convened to consider the how the federal government 
could do more to address brutality among the ranks of local police.112 
The subcommittee members called various experts within the field of 
policing law, including Paul Hoffman, the legal director of the American 
Civil Liberties Union (ALCU) of Southern California.  Hoffman and his 
colleagues at the ACLU used the Rodney King incident to illustrate the 
 
 107. Id. at 111 (“Absent a sufficient likelihood that he will again be wronged in a similar 
way, Lyons is no more entitled to an injunction than any other citizen of Los Angeles.”). 
 108. Id. at 102 (explaining that injunctive relief is only appropriate when a plaintiff is 
“immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury”). 
 109. Id. at 111–13 (denying injunctive relief). 
 110. Harmon, supra note 4, at 12 n.31 (“On March 2, 1991, Los Angeles Police 
Department officers attempted to subdue Rodney King, an African-American man, after a 
high-speed chase.  King initially resisted arrest, and officers fired a taser at him and struck 
him with batons in order to subdue him.  As a videotape of the incident famously portrayed, 
officers continued to stomp on King, kick him, and strike him with baton blows even after he 
lay prone on the ground.”). 
 111. For a detailed account of the Rodney King events, see Seth Mydans, Videotaped 
Beating by Officers Puts Full Glare on Brutality Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1991, at A1. 
 112. The Rodney King beating happened on March 3, 1991.  On March 20, 1991, the 
House Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary 
called a hearing to discuss the issue of police brutality.  At this hearing, discussion of the 
Rodney King incident clearly dominated discussions. See Police Brutality Hearing, supra 
note 6. 
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need for Congress to authorize structural police reform.113  Republican 
subcommittee members generally opposed such a grant of power to the 
federal government.114  Democratic representatives, though, immediately 
supported the idea.115  Soon thereafter, a contingent of Democratic 
leaders—many of whom served on the subcommittee—put forward a bill 
authorizing both public and private structural police reform.116  Labeled the 
Police Accountability Act of 1991, this measure was ultimately 
incorporated into the Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1991.117  A 
Republican filibuster derailed this first legislative attempt to authorize 
structural police reform.118  Three years later, a similar measure found its 
way into the VCCLEA of 1994 and became law soon thereafter.119 
It is important to recognize that structural police reform, as authorized in 
1994, was not an innovative idea.  “On three separate occasions” before the 
passage of § 14141, Congress considered giving the attorney general 
authority to seek equitable relief.120  Each time Congress rejected such an 
expansion of federal authority into the realm of local policing.121  During 
the same time, Congress expanded the attorney general’s authority to 
initiate structural reform litigation in numerous other institutional contexts, 
including employment, education, housing, and voter rights, among 
others.122  In many respects, local policing was the last institutional context 
 
 113. Id. at 54–118 (showing the transcripts of Hoffman’s testimony before the 
Subcommittee, specifically on page 61 when Hoffman states that “[i]f there is a pattern or 
practice of abuse, the Justice Department ought to be able to deal with it”). 
 114. See id. at 2 (reporting Republican Representative Howard Coble’s statement that he 
would “like for this sort of misconduct, for want of a better word, to be resolved internally”). 
 115. See, e.g., id. at 131 (reporting Democratic Representative Don Edwards’s statement 
that the suggestion that Congress authorize the DOJ to initiate pattern or practice litigation is 
a “very, very useful concrete thing[]” that they could do). 
 116. Police Accountability Act of 1991, H.R. 2972, 102d Cong.  The measure was 
sponsored by Representatives William Edwards, Howard Berman, John Conyers, Julian 
Dixon, Mervyn Dymally, Michael Kopetski, Meldon Levine, Craig Washington, and Maxine 
Waters.  Four of those individuals—Edwards, Conyers, Washington, and Kopetski—served 
on the Subcommittee that heard the initial recommendation that Congress expand structural 
police reform authority to the DOJ. 
 117. H.R. 3371, 102d Cong.; see also Federal Response to Police Misconduct:  Hearing 
Before the H. Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 
103rd Cong. 2 (1992) [hereinafter Federal Response to Police Misconduct] (statement of 
Rep. William Edwards, Member, H. Comm. on the Judiciary) (noting that a structural police 
reform measure was incorporated into the Omnibus Crime Bill of 1991). 
 118. Federal Response to Police Misconduct, supra note 117, at 2 (reporting 
Representative Edwards’s statement that, after the subcommittee unanimously approved the 
structural police reform measure and incorporated the measure into the Omnibus Crime Bill 
of 1991, “there’s been a filibuster ever since on the whole crime bill”). 
 119. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 
§ 210401, 108 Stat. 1796, 2071. 
 120. Police Brutality Hearing, supra note 6, at 27 (reporting Assistant Attorney General 
of the Civil Rights Division John R. Dunne’s statement in his Subcommittee testimony that 
Congress considered such a proposal in 1957, 1959, and 1964—rejecting it each time). 
 121. Id. 
 122. Harmon, supra note 4, at 11 (“In other civil rights arenas, such as education, voting, 
housing, and prisons, structural reform litigation has supplemented damages actions and 
criminal punishment as a tool for generating change in public institutions.”). 
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to join the structural reform litigation party.  The Rodney King crisis 
provided liberal factions in Congress with a jarring, highly public example 
of misconduct in a local government.  This horrifying incident of police 
wrongdoing legitimized congressional interest in expanding the use of 
structural reform litigation to yet another institutional context—local 
policing. 
In the sections that follow, I describe the road to structural police reform.  
I begin by briefly recounting the role of the Rodney King incident in 
elevating the issue of police accountability to the national stage.  I then 
describe the passage of structural police reform.  I conclude by elaborating 
on how structural police reform has reimagined the traditional approach to 
police regulation. 
A.  The Rodney King Incident and Renewed Interest  
in Structural Police Reform 
Many writers claim that the Rodney King incident ignited concerns about 
widespread misconduct in the LAPD and built political support for the 
passage of § 14141.123  Thus, it seems appropriate to start the Los Angeles 
story by recounting the events of the Rodney King beating.  The Rodney 
King beating would likely never have become a national story without the 
amateur camera work of George Holliday.124  The Holliday tape showed 
LAPD kicking and striking King “with 56 baton strokes.”125  Within days, 
video of the beating appeared on national news across the country, sparking 
public outcry and calls for the resignation of LAPD Chief Daryl Gates.126  
Famously, Chief Gates referred to the incident as “an aberration,” 
suggesting that it was not demonstrative of a broader problem with the 
LAPD.127 
 
 123. Id. at 12–13 (discussing the role of the Rodney King beating in moving Congress to 
act); see also DARRELL L. ROSS, CIVIL LIABILITY IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 183–85 (2012) 
(identifying the King beating as a major turning point in police regulation, precipitating 
§ 14141); Gilles, supra note 14, at 1401 (stating that “[i]n 1991, however, the brutal beating 
of Los Angeles resident Rodney King by six LAPD officers, caught on tape and broadcast 
repeatedly in the days following the incident, focused national attention on the problem of 
police abuse and spurred Congress to action” and explaining how Congress opted to grant 
the Attorney General an equitable right of action). 
 124. Tape of Police Beating Causes Major Furor, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 6, 1991, at A2 
(“The video, shot by amateur photographer George Holliday, shows no indication that King 
tried to hit or charge the officers.”). 
 125. INDEP. COMM’N ON THE L.A. POLICE DEP’T, REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT 
COMMISSION ON THE LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT 3 (1991). 
 126. Id. at 3 (“Within days, television stations across the country broadcast and 
rebroadcast the tape, provoking a public outcry against police abuse.”); An ‘Aberration’ or 
Police Business As Usual?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 1994, at E7 (“More than 1,000 callers from 
around the country phoned Mr. Gates’s office expressing their outrage and demanding that 
he resign.”). 
 127. David Parrish, Activists:  L.A. Police ‘Street Justice’ Brutal, SPOKESMAN-REV., Mar. 
10, 1991, at A3 (quoting Chief Gates as saying that the event was an aberration, and that 
“[i]t’s not the kind of conduct that we have normally from our officers”). 
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The pursuit started around 12:30 a.m.128 when California Highway Patrol 
(CHP) officers first observed King’s Hyundai speeding in the northeastern 
San Fernando Valley in Los Angeles.129  When the CHP officers put on 
their emergency lights and sirens, King slowed but did not stop.130  An 
LAPD squad car—assigned to Officers Laurence Powell and Timothy 
Wind—then joined the pursuit.131  At around 12:50 a.m., Powell and Ward 
radioed in a “Code 6,” which signifies that a chase had come to a close.132  
The LAPD Radio Transmission Operator then broadcast a “Code 4,” a 
notification to all officers that no additional assistance is needed at the 
scene of the pursuit.133  Despite these transmissions, eleven additional 
LAPD units with twenty-one officers and a helicopter appeared at the 
scene; at least twelve of the officers arrived after the Radio Transmission 
Operator had sent out the Code 4 broadcast.134  The Christopher 
Commission—an independent panel assigned to investigate the events—
found that “[a] number of these officers had no convincing explanation for 
why they went to the scene after the Code 4 broadcast.”135 
Initially after the stop, the CHP officers attempted to take the lead and 
arrest King.136  But LAPD officers soon took over, with LAPD Sergeant 
Stacey Koon telling the CHP officer “that they [the LAPD] would handle 
it.”137  Sergeant Koon initially perceived King as threatening, disoriented, 
and potentially under the influence of PCP.138  Sergeant Koon ordered King 
to lay flat on the ground—a command that LAPD officers claim King 
refused to obey.139  Officer Powell claimed that as he tried to force King to 
 
 128. Mydans, supra note 111 (“Shortly before 12:30 A.M. on Sunday, March 3, Mr. King 
was driving fast down the Foothill Freeway near San Fernando, at the northern edge of Los 
Angeles.”). 
 129. INDEP. COMM’N ON THE L.A. POLICE DEP’T, supra note 125, at 4.  Notably, King was 
not alone in the car at the time of the incident.  Two other passengers were in the car, both 
African-American.  Details also emerged that King was traveling at approximately 110 to 
115 miles per hour, according to the CHP. Id. 
 130. In addition to not stopping, King allegedly “left the freeway and continued through a 
stop sign at the bottom of the ramp at approximately 50 m.p.h.” Id.  The CHP also reports 
that King continued to then drive at a high speed and eventually run a red light at 
approximately 80 miles per hour. Id. 
 131. Id.  In addition to the squad car driven by Powell and Wind, “[a] Los Angeles 
Unified School District Police squad car which was in the area also joined the pursuit.” Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 5 (“[A] Code 4 notifies all units that ‘additional assistance is not needed at the 
scene’ and indicates that all units not at the scene ‘shall return to their assigned patrol 
area.’”). 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id.  For example, “one of these officers told District Attorney investigators that he 
proceeded to the scene after the Code 4 ‘to see what was happening.’” Id. 
 136. Id. (“At the termination of the pursuit, CHP Officer Timothy Singer, following 
‘felony stop’ procedures, used a loudspeaker to order all occupants out of King’s car.”). 
 137. Id. at 6.  This happened after CHP Officer Melanie Singer attempted to perform a 
“felony kneeling” procedure to take King into custody. Id. 
 138. Id. (adding that although he “felt threatened,” he still “felt enough confidence in his 
officers to take care of the situation”). 
 139. Id. (“According to Koon and Powell, King responded by getting down on all fours 
and slapping the ground and refusing to lie down.”). 
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the ground, King “rose up and almost knocked him off his feet.”140  
Sergeant Koon then used an electric stun gun twice on King.141  The 
George Holliday video begins around this time.142  At the start of the tape, 
King is on the ground and appears to move in the direction of one of the 
officers.143  The officer viewed this as a “lunge” in his direction, although 
the report notes that this move would also be consistent with King simply 
trying to “get away.”144  At this point, Officer Powell hit King in the head 
with a baton, causing King to fall to the ground immediately.  King then 
rose to his knees where officers struck King over and over.  Sergeant Koon 
ordered the officers to use “power strokes,” telling officers to “hit his joints, 
hit his wrists, hit his elbows, hit his knees, [and] hit his ankles.”145  In total, 
officers struck King with batons fifty-six times and kicked him six times.146  
Officers then “dragged [King] on his stomach to the side of the road to 
await arrival of a rescue ambulance.”147  Although there were some 
allegations by local news teams that officers yelled racial epithets during 
the beating, these allegations were deemed inconclusive by the 
investigators.148  In the video tape, it appears that only once “did any officer 
try to intervene.”149  About twenty witnesses from nearby apartments 
gathered to watch the events from a nearby apartment complex.150  
Witnesses told reporters that they were yelling at the police “don’t kill him” 
as the officers beat King.151 
King received twenty stitches and suffered a broken cheekbone and right 
ankle.152  Amazingly, officials initially charged King with both speeding 
and resisting arrest.153  But as the video of the incident circulated around 
 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id.  It is unclear from the reports whether or not the stun gun had a serious effect on 
King.  The Christopher Commission reports that Sergeant Koon felt that King did not 
respond to the stun gun, while another officer’s report finds that the stun gun did have an 
effect as King shook and yelled for approximately five seconds. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 7. 
 146. Id. (“Finally, after 56 baton blows and six kicks, five or six officers swarmed in and 
placed King in both handcuffs and cordcuffs restraining his arms and legs.”). 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. at 8. 
 149. Mydans, supra note 111. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. (quoting Elois Camp, a sixty-five-year-old retired school teacher who watched 
the events from her nearby apartment). 
 152. INDEP. COMM’N ON THE L.A. POLICE DEP’T, supra note 125, at 8 (noting that in 
addition to these undeniable injuries, King alleged in his civil complaint that he “suffered 
‘11 skull fractures, permanent brain damage, broken [bones and teeth], kidney damage, [and] 
emotional and physical trauma’”).  It is also worth noting that about five hours after his 
arrest, King had a blood-alcohol level of 0.075 percent, which suggests that he was legally 
drunk at the time of the events.  A blood alcohol level of 0.08 percent is sufficient to prove 
legal intoxication.  Since blood alcohol decreases every hour without alcohol at a relatively 
constant rate, it can be safely assumed that King’s blood alcohol level was above 0.08 
percent at the time of the chase and subsequent police misconduct. Id. 
 153. An ‘Aberration’ or Police Business As Usual?, supra note 126. 
3212 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82 
the nation, prosecutors decided to drop the charges.154  After the events, 
details began to emerge about the background of the officers involved in the 
beating.  A total of twenty-three officers had appeared at the scene of the 
beating at some point.155  Four officers were directly involved in the use of 
illegal force against King—Sergeant Stacey Koon, and Officers Laurence 
Powell, Theodore Briseno, and Timothy Wind.156  One of the officers 
involved in the beating had previously been suspended for sixty-six days in 
1987 for beating a handcuffed man.157  The other three officers had been 
subject to various complaints for excessive use of force—most of which the 
LAPD found to be unsubstantiated.158  Another ten officers were physically 
present, primarily as bystanders, during the incident.159  Of these ten 
bystander officers, four were actually field training officers that were 
“responsible for supervising ‘probationary’ officers in their first year after 
graduation from the Police Academy.”160 
Observers across the country immediately condemned the behavior of the 
officers involved in the King beating.  President George H. W. Bush called 
the events “shocking” and called for the Justice Department to investigate 
the incident.161  Professor Jerome Skolnick commented that the violent 
confrontation was “going to be the historical event for police in our 
time.”162  Skolnick further predicted that the behavior was indicative of a 
larger problem in the LAPD, explaining that “[t]wo people can go crazy, 
but if you have 10 or 12 people watching them and not doing anything, this 
tells you that this is a normal thing for them.”163  Although Chief Gates 
 
 154. Id. (“But those charges were dropped after the police chief, Darryl F. Gates, 
conceded that the tape showed unnecessary force being used and said that some of the police 
involved would face charges instead.”). 
 155. INDEP. COMM’N ON THE L.A. POLICE DEP’T, supra note 125, at 11.  The report further 
clarified that these officers varied in age from 23 to 48.  Of the officers at the scene, two 
were African American, four were Latino, and seventeen were white. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Mydans, supra note 111, at 3.  One officer even told a reporter from the New York 
Times of the “magic pencil” that police officers used to make such misconduct allegations 
disappear. Id. 
 158. INDEP. COMM’N ON THE L.A. POLICE DEP’T, supra note 125, at 12.  The full 
explanation of the officers past misconduct is reproduced below: 
According to press reports, another officer had been suspended for five days in 
1986 for failing to report his use of force against a suspect following a vehicle 
pursuit and a foot chase.  (The suspect’s excessive force complaint against the 
officer was held “not sustained” by the LAPD.)  A third indicted officer was the 
subject of a 1986 “not sustained” complaint for excessive force against a 
handcuffed suspect.  Since the King incident, that officer has been sued by a 
citizen who alleges that the officer broke his arm by hitting him with a baton in 
1989. 
Id. 
 159. Id. at 11 (“Ten other LAPD officers were actually present on the ground during 
some portion of the beating.”). 
 160. Id. at 11–12. 
 161. Mydans, supra note 111. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
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agreed that the events were “shocking,”164 he insisted that that they were 
the result of a few bad officers, not any systemic problems within the 
department.165  The Los Angeles District Attorney’s Office secured 
criminal indictments against Sergeant Koon and Officers Powell, Briseno, 
and Wind.166  The District Attorney’s Office did not seek indictments 
against the seventeen officers at the scene who “did not attempt to prevent 
the beating or report it to their superiors.”167  The prosecution resulted in an 
acquittal followed by days of chaos and rioting in Los Angeles and 
surrounding areas.168  Although federal prosecutors successfully secured 
convictions against two of the officers involved, such an effort provided no 
deterrent for “the dozen officers present for the beating.”169 
A little over two weeks after the shocking events in Los Angeles, the 
House Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights convened a 
hearing on police brutality in the United States.170  While Representatives 
claimed that they did not intend the subcommittee hearing to only discuss 
the Rodney King incident, discussions of the incident dominated 
conversation.171  Throughout the hearing, Representatives asked witnesses 
about the causes of the Rodney King beating and ways that Congress could 
use federal resources to prevent such events in the future.  Democratic 
representatives quickly suggested the use of structural police reform to 
address systemic patterns of misconduct in local police agencies.172  In his 
testimony before the subcommittee, the legal director of the ACLU of 
Southern California further reiterated the importance of such a measure.173  
During these initial subcommittee meetings, legislators discussed laws that 
would allow both the attorney general and private litigants to initiate 
structural police reform.174  Granting this power to individual litigants was 
particularly controversial at the time, but the drafters of the law felt that it 
was “necessary to experiment with new legal theories to reform the way 
 
 164. INDEP. COMM’N ON THE L.A. POLICE DEP’T, supra note 125, at 12. 
 165. Parrish, supra note 127 (explaining that the events were a mere aberration and not 
indicative of a broader problem). 
 166. INDEP. COMM’N ON THE L.A. POLICE DEP’T, supra note 125, at 13. 
 167. Id.  It is worth noting, though, that “[t]he District Attorney . . . referred the matter of 
the bystanders to the United States Attorney for an assessment of whether federal civil rights 
laws were violated.” Id. 
 168. Harmon, supra note 4, at 12. 
 169. Id. at 13. 
 170. See generally Police Brutality Hearing, supra note 6. 
 171. Id. at 1 (“Our purpose in this subcommittee is not to focus on [the Rodney King 
beating] in isolation, but to examine the issues more broadly.”). 
 172. Democratic Representative Craig Washington appears to make the first reference to 
pattern or practice litigation as a possibility. Id. at 27. 
 173. Id. at 61 (reporting Paul Hoffman’s suggestion of the use of pattern or practice 
litigation). 
 174. The testimony of famous litigator Johnnie Cochran is indicative of the 
subcommittee’s contemplated granting of authority to private litigants to initiate structural 
police reform.  In his statement to the subcommittee, Cochran explained that after Lyons, 
Congress had to do more than merely grant private litigants the authority to initiate structural 
police reform—it needed to a make clear statement about the basis for the private litigants’ 
standing. Federal Response to Police Misconduct, supra note 117, at 76. 
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police departments conducted themselves.”175  Conservative lawmakers and 
police advocates claimed that the inclusion of such a measure would lead to 
frivolous and expensive litigation since “[a]ny individual who feels 
aggrieved by conduct that [he or she] perceives to be part of a pattern or 
practice can file a suit.”176  The George H. W. Bush DOJ and police 
advocacy groups strongly opposed the inclusion of any such individual 
right of action, eventually contributing to the measure’s failure.177 
Despite this conservative criticism, liberal members of Congress soon 
introduced the Police Accountability Act of 1991—which would have 
authorized both private and publicly initiated structural police reform.  The 
Act was eventually incorporated into the Omnibus Crime Control Act of 
1991 as Title XII.178  To make the measure more appealing to Republicans, 
lawmakers in the Conference Committee for the Omnibus Crime Control 
Act removed the portion of Title XII that authorized private claims for 
equitable relief against police departments.179  The portion of the law that 
granted the DOJ the authority to seek injunctive relief was less 
controversial, likely in part because it was roughly analogous to powers 
granted to the DOJ in other similar contexts:  school desegregation, 
employment discrimination, public housing, and prison condition cases.180  
But even this compromise was not enough to win over conservatives, and 
Title XII died via filibuster.181  Democratic legislators would soon revive 
Title XII by inserting a similar measure into the VCCLEA two years 
later.182  The VCCLEA, which became law in 1994, was an enormous bill 
touching on nearly every aspect of the criminal justice system.183  The 
national news media paid virtually no attention to the passage of structural 
police reform in 1994. 
 
 175. Gilles, supra note 14, at 1403. 
 176. Terence Moran & Daniel Klaidman, Police Brutality Poses Quandary for Justice 
Dept., LEGAL TIMES, May 4, 1992, at 24. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Gilles, supra note 14, at 1402. 
 179. Id. at 1403. 
 180. Id. at 1402–03. 
 181. Joan Biskupic, Crime Measure Is a Casualty of Partisan Skirmishing, 49 CQ 
WEEKLY 3528, 3530 (1991). 
 182. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 
§ 210401, 108 Stat. 1796, 2071. 
 183. For an excellent summary of these components and a detailed historical account of 
the VCCLEA’s passage, see LORD WINDLESHAM, POLITICS, PUNISHMENT, AND POPULISM 
(1998). In total, the Act cost taxpayers an estimated $30 billion. Id. at 122.  The Act 
provided funding for 100,000 more community police officers. Id.  It also provided $9.9 
billion for new prison construction. SHAHID M. SHAHIDULLAH, CRIME POLICY IN AMERICA:  
LAWS, INSTITUTIONS, AND PROGRAMS 17 (2008).  The VCCLEA also mandated strict truth-
in-sentencing requirements, implemented life sentences for repeat violent offenders, banned 
nineteen types of assault weapons, banned juvenile ownership of handguns, added additional 
penalties for hate crimes, and extended the death penalty. Id.  Additionally, the Act allocated 
another “$2.6 billion for the Federal Bureau of Investigations, the Drug Enforcement 
Agency, Immigration and Naturalization Services, United States Attorney Offices, and other 
Justice Department components.” ERICA R. MEINERS, RIGHT TO BE HOSTILE:  SCHOOLS, 
PRISONS, AND THE MAKING OF PUBLIC ENEMIES 103 (2007). 
2014] FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT OF POLICE REFORM 3215 
Regardless of the lack of attention, the introduction of structural police 
reform was a dramatic departure from the traditional approach to regulation 
of local policing behavior.  Structural police reform has fundamentally 
reimaged the role of the federal government in regulating local law 
enforcement wrongdoing.  It introduces a new branch of government to the 
field of police regulation—the federal executive branch.  It also transforms 
our understanding of police misconduct.  Structural police reform implicitly 
assumes that systemic police misconduct is an organizational, rather than an 
individual officer, problem.  And perhaps most importantly, structural 
police reform makes police accountability measures mandatory.  It uses the 
courts to do whatever is necessary to implement radical policy and 
procedural changes.  Although potentially underappreciated within mass 
media, structural police reform had the potential to transform the regulation 
of local police. 
B.  Previous Research on Structural Police Reform 
Since the passage of § 14141, very little scholarship in any discipline has 
empirically analyzed structural police reform.  And virtually no legal 
scholarship has done an empirical examination of the topic.  Initially, 
criminal justice observers were optimistic about the potential of § 14141.  
The late Professor William Stuntz remarked that § 14141 may be one of the 
most significant historical developments in the regulation of police 
misconduct.184  Indeed, there was reason for optimism.  Section 14141 
seemingly filled a significant hole in the regulatory strategy for police 
misconduct.  As Barbara Armacost explained, “reform efforts have focused 
too much on notorious incidents and misbehaving individuals, and too little 
on an overly aggressive police culture that facilitates and rewards violent 
conduct.”185  If a department wants to engage in “[r]eal reform,” it must 
“accept collective responsibility, not only for heroism, but for police 
brutality and corruption as well.”186  Indeed, occasional misconduct is an 
unavoidable consequence of granting police officers the discretion to 
successfully carry out their jobs.  Consistent patterns of misconduct are 
more commonly rooted in organizational culture, rather than the 
professional or moral failings of the individual officers.  Additionally, cost-
raising misconduct regulations can incentivize some reform, but have 
historically proven ineffective at stimulating significant broad policy 
changes.  Thus, most commentators agreed that structural police reform 
“create[d] an unprecedented opportunity for the federal government to 
encourage collaborative reform of deficient police institutions.”187  Since 
then, three empirical studies have assessed the effectiveness of § 14141 in 
individual cities. 
 
 184. William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV. 
781, 798 (2006) (calling structural police reform “the most important legal initiative of the 
past twenty years in the sphere of police regulation”). 
 185. Armacost, supra note 2, at 455. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Simmons, supra note 14, at 528. 
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First, the Vera Institute of Justice completed an empirical evaluation of 
the long-term effects of the negotiated settlement, sometimes called a 
consent decree, in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, years after monitors left the 
city.188  The Vera report found that the reforms implemented as part of the 
consent decree remained in effect after the monitors departed.189  Second, 
Professors Christopher Stone, Todd Foglesong, and Christine Cole 
examined the success of the Los Angeles consent decree.190  The results 
were extremely positive.191  The third study comes from a doctoral 
 
 188. ROBERT C. DAVIS, NICOLE J. HENDERSON & CHRISTOPHER W. ORTIZ, CAN FEDERAL 
INTERVENTION BRING LASTING IMPROVEMENT IN LOCAL POLICING?  THE PITTSBURGH 
CONSENT DECREE (2005), available at http://www.calea.org/content/calea-2010-annual-
report.  There, researchers surveyed over 100 frontline officers, conducted focus groups, 
interviewed key officials, reviewed monitor reports, surveyed citizenry, and analyzed police 
statistics. Id. at 5–6. 
 189. See id. at 17.  The Vera evaluation states that “the officers clearly indicated—as had 
the command staff—that the accountability mechanisms remained intact after the lifting of 
the decree.”  This suggests that the reforms were at least somewhat effective.  Even so, the 
authors of the study noted some possible problems with the reform strategy used in 
Pittsburgh.  The consent decree negotiation and implementation alienated some officers on 
the force—many of whom complained that morale sunk after the department agreed to the 
terms of the consent decree. Id. at 42.  Other officers believed that the reforms discouraged 
them from proactively policing the streets for fear of being “disciplined for filling out forms 
improperly” or being burdened with “duplicative paperwork.” Id.  Supervisors similarly 
grumbled that the procedures implemented by the consent decree reduced time spent on the 
street and increased time addressing procedural formalities. Id.  Vera also noted that one of 
the primary effects of the consent decree was to centralize decisionmaking and disciplinary 
review.  The report concluded that the “centralized approach to identifying and responding to 
officer misconduct makes good sense in the wake of allegations of civil rights violations” but 
may also run “counter to the decentralizing imperative of the other major police reforms of 
the past two decades:  community policing.” Id. at 41–42.  This means that officers in 
Pittsburgh after the implementation of the consent decree may have exercised less discretion 
and responsibility over their work. 
 190. See CHRISTOPHER STONE, TODD FOGLESONG & CHRISTINE M. COLE, POLICING LOS 
ANGELES UNDER A CONSENT DECREE:  THE DYNAMICS OF CHANGE AT THE LAPD (2009), 
available at http://www.lapdonline.org/assets/pdf/Harvard-LAPD%20Study.pdf.  There, 
researchers undertook hundreds of hours of participant observation, analyzed administrative 
data on crime, arrests, traffic/pedestrian stops, use of force, and personnel.  They also 
conducted surveys of the police officers, detainees, and residents of Los Angeles. Id. at i–ii. 
 191. Unlike the Vera study, Stone and his colleagues found no evidence for the 
hypothesis that the implementation of the terms of a consent decree lead to “de-policing”—
or “hesitat[ion] to intervene in difficult circumstances for fear that, despite their best 
intentions, their actions will be criticized and they may even be disciplined.” Id. at 19.  Like 
in the Vera study, officers “frequently” raised concerns about how the terms of a consent 
decree can hamper their abilities to exercise discretion, commonly saying that paperwork 
deterred them from making arrests, and arguing that compliance with the terms of the decree 
hurt their ability to proactively fight crime on the streets. Id. at 19–20.  But the researchers in 
the Stone study rejected the claim that the terms of the consent decree uniquely burdened the 
LAPD’s ability to fight crime.  They showed that since the start of the consent decree, motor 
vehicle and pedestrian stops actually increased significantly. Id. at 22.  Once more, 
comparisons between similar surveys conducted in 1999 and 2003 found that the percentage 
of officers who reported being afraid that an honest mistake would negatively impact their 
careers actually decreased. Id. at 21.  This led Stone and his colleagues to conclude that most 
of the concern about depolicing was likely misplaced.  By all accounts, crime has decreased 
significantly faster in Los Angeles than other American cities since the implementation of 
the consent decree. Stephen Rushin, Structural Police Reform, 99 MINN. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2015) (on file with author) (manuscript at 56–57) (showing that during the 
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dissertation written by Professor Joshua Chanin.192  Chanin evaluated the 
effects of the § 14141 litigation in Washington, D.C.; Pittsburgh; Prince 
George’s County, Maryland; and Cincinnati, Ohio.193  Chanin hoped to do a 
retrospective on cities that had completed the terms of the negotiated 
settlement.194  Thus, at the time that Chanin started his study, these four 
cities represented two-thirds of all cities that fell into this category.195  
Unlike the Stone and the Vera case studies, Chanin’s dissertation provides 
multiple intensive analyses of individual cities, allowing him to make 
comparative conclusions.  Chanin hypothesized that several variables affect 
the implementation of negotiated settlements, including  the complexity of 
the negotiated settlement, departmental resources, and the support of police 
administrators as well as local political leaders for the negotiated 
settlement.196 
 
structural police reform era, violent crimes in Los Angeles fell by 65 percent and property 
crime rates by 36 percent—both figures far exceeding the median large American city).  And 
the traffic and pedestrian stops today lead to arrests more often than in years past. STONE, 
FOGLESONG & COLE, supra note 190, at 24.  This suggests that Los Angeles police have 
become even more proactive since the start of the consent decree and have actually become 
more effective at targeting proactive policing efforts towards actual wrongdoers.  More to 
the point, though, the LAPD has also apparently decreased the use of force since the 
beginning of the consent decree as well. Id. at 32.  This is a particularly striking finding since 
during the same time that use of force declined, the total number of arrests actually increased 
substantially. Id. at 35.  The Stone examination of Los Angeles also addressed the concerns 
expressed in the Vera study about the effect of the consent decree on community relations.  
Overall, community satisfaction with the LAPD increased during the implementation of the 
consent decree, and this pattern continued after the conclusion of the federal intervention. Id. 
at 44.  Like in Pittsburgh, the community’s satisfaction differed based on the race of the 
respondent, with the black community somewhat less enthusiastic about the performance of 
the police department. Id.  But overall, there was less concern in Los Angeles than in 
Pittsburgh about the implications of federal intervention on community outreach efforts. 
 192. Chanin, supra note 16. 
 193. Id. at 21–22. 
 194. Id. at 22. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. at iii–iv (stating that “[s]everal factors help to explain variation between 
departments, including the complexity of joint action, agency and jurisdictional resources, 
active and capable police leadership, and support from local political leaders” and 
hypothesizing that “(1) the policy problem; (2) the policy solution; (3) the environmental 
context; and (4) the implementing agency” all define the implementation of structural police 
reform).  It is also worth mentioning that, like the Vera study, Chanin worried that the 
“centralized approach at the heart of the pattern or practice reform template seems to have 
little in common with the [community-oriented policing] model.” Id. at 358.  Chanin 
concluded his comparative study with numerous normative recommendations.  He argued 
that the structural reform litigation process ought to include more external oversight and 
reporting mechanisms after the end of the reform process. Id. at 346–49.  Chanin also 
suggested that the development and implementation of consent decrees should be more 
inclusive, using a bottom-up approach. Id. at 350.  To this end, he recommended the 
inclusion of union representatives and key civil rights organizations in the settlement 
process, the use of community goals in formulating the settlement content, and the regular 
updating of community and civil rights stakeholders after the start of the implementation 
process. Id. at 351. 
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The legal academy has also made several worthwhile contributions to the 
literature on structural police reform.197  These authors have generally 
offered normative recommendations on how the DOJ could improve the 
effectiveness of structural police reform.  Professor Kami Chavis Simmons 
has targeted a different problem in § 14141 cases—the representation of the 
various community stakeholders in the negotiation and implementation of 
settlement agreements.198  Simmons used Cincinnati in part as an example 
of how the DOJ’s implementation process could more effectively 
incorporate collaboration with various stakeholders.199  Other legal 
academics have discussed structural police reform, including Professor 
Debra Livingston, who analyzed the consent decrees in Steubenville, Ohio, 
and Pittsburgh to identify the types of misconduct that the DOJ targeted in 
negotiated settlements.200  Samuel Walker and Morgan Macdonald have 
recommended the expansion of pattern or practice litigation to the state 
level.201 
Overall, these studies provide valuable insight into the structural reform 
process.  But they fail to answer many important research questions.  None 
of the three studies thoroughly examine the process by which the DOJ 
identifies cities to target under § 14141.  This is a critical piece of missing 
information in the scholarship.  Although Professor Rachel Harmon has 
theorized on how the DOJ could change this selection process,202 there 
remains a descriptive gap in the literature on the process by which the DOJ 
currently identifies cities engaged in a pattern or practice of police 
misconduct. 
III.  THE ENFORCEMENT OF STRUCTURAL POLICE REFORM 
The available literature on structural police reform lacks a thorough 
empirical study of the enforcement policies used by the DOJ.  In order to 
fill this gap, I use a multimethod analysis that includes both quantitative and 
qualitative measures.  I combined these methods to build an empirical 
understanding of how the DOJ enforced § 14141 and how this enforcement 
has changed over time.  I start by summarizing the basic structure of the 
current enforcement model.  I then examine how enforcement has changed 
over time. 
 
 197. See, e.g., Armacost, supra note 2; Gilles, supra note 14; Harmon, supra note 4; 
Simmons, supra note 14; Walker & Macdonald, supra note 10. 
 198. See generally Simmons, supra note 14. 
 199. Id. at 531.  By determining a broad range of potential stakeholders and incorporating 
them into the structural reform process, Simmons claims that the DOJ can restore the 
political legitimacy of the process, provide a check on DOJ authority, and create innovative 
and uniquely tailored remedies. Id. at 537–40. 
 200. See generally Livingston, supra note 2. 
 201. See generally Walker & Macdonald, supra note 10. 
 202. See Harmon, supra note 4.  I discuss Rachel Harmon’s arguments in significant 
detail later in this Article. See infra Part IV.B. 
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A.  A Summary of the Present Enforcement Model 
This Article focuses on the three stages of review that the DOJ uses to 
identify police departments engaged in a pattern or practice of 
unconstitutional misconduct—(1) case selection, (2) preliminary inquiry, 
and (3) formal investigation.  These steps represent only part of the 
structural police reform process.  I will more thoroughly discuss the later 
stages of the structural police reform process in another forthcoming 
article.203  In the subsections that follow, I use empirical data to describe 
these three preliminary stages of structural police reform. 
1.  Case Selection 
The first step in the structural police reform process is the identification 
of problematic police agencies.  I call this the case selection process.  While 
past literature has identified the basic steps of structural police reform, the 
process by which the DOJ identifies cities for scrutiny remains somewhat of 
a mystery—described publicly in mere generalities by the DOJ.204  This has 
led many agencies subject to § 14141 litigation to feel unfairly targeted.  As 
Gary Dufour, former City Manager of Steubenville, bluntly asked a reporter 
after the DOJ targeted his city with pattern or practice litigation, “We’re an 
awfully small community.  You see all these problems that have come up at 
the police departments in Los Angeles and New York and New Orleans, 
and you’ve got to wonder, why us?”205  Unfortunately for Mr. Dufour, the 
DOJ has not been transparent about the selection process for § 14141 
investigations.206  Professor Michael Selmi has echoed this sentiment, 
observing that “it doesn’t seem like [Justice Department officials] have a 
very strategic approach—they simply react to cases brought to them.”207  
Through interviews with DOJ insiders, I found that since 1994, the agency 
has used five major mechanisms to identify problematic departments under 
this statute. 
First, in some cases the DOJ has used existing civil litigation or private 
interest group investigations as springboards for § 14141 cases.  This 
appears to have been the motivating factor in the DOJ’s initial selections of 
Steubenville, Pittsburgh, and Columbus, Ohio—“persistent efforts by 
lawyers and civil rights advocates . . . flood[ed] the Justice Department with 
complaints” that provided the basis for a formal investigation.208  In the 
case of existing litigation, DOJ intervention in the case through § 14141 can 
 
 203. Rushin, supra note 191. 
 204. Conduct of Law Enforcement Agencies, U.S. DEP’T JUST., http://www.justice.gov/
crt/about/spl/police.php (last visited April 26, 2014) (stating that the DOJ uses “information 
from a variety of sources” to select cases for § 14141 litigation). 
 205. Lichtblau, supra note 29. 
 206. Conduct of Law Enforcement Agencies, supra note 204 (providing very few details 
on the case selection process except to say that the DOJ considers community input while 
also utilizing a variety of other information sources). 
 207. Lichtblau, supra note 29 (alteration in original) (quoting Professor Michael Selmi). 
 208. Nicole Marshall, Why Investigate Us?  Police Ask, TULSA WORLD, Apr. 1, 2001, at 
A1. 
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increase the likelihood of an injunctive remedy.  Participants from the DOJ 
also emphasized how civil rights attorneys and civil liberties groups like the 
NAACP and ACLU have built sufficiently persuasive cases of allegedly 
systemic misconduct to necessitate a DOJ inquiry.209  For example, as a 
DOJ insider explained, both the NAACP and the ACLU took part in the 
initial Pittsburgh allegations; these groups “were in it from the 
beginning.”210  These organizations have sometimes collected dozens of 
complaints demonstrating a common or systemic problem in one 
jurisdiction necessitating DOJ action.  Steubenville exemplified this 
method, according to one former DOJ litigator.  Notable Ohio civil rights 
attorney James McNamara “used to litigate against Steubenville all the 
time.”211  In one particularly relevant case, McNamara “filed a Monnell 
count” which included an “affidavit that went through fifty or sixty . . . 
misconduct incidents.”212  Although the former litigator could not 
remember whether “he won or lost,” the litigator did remember that “he 
sent the file to the Justice Department.  And that’s how the case got 
started.”213  This method of case selection saves resources, as it often 
provides the DOJ with a thoroughly investigated group of allegations ready 
for further inquiry.214  Internal policies have varied over the years on 
whether the DOJ ought to coordinate with traditionally liberal interest 
groups in formulating targets for inquiries and investigations.215 
Second, the DOJ regularly monitors media reports of systemic 
misconduct.216  While any single, discrete media report of misconduct is 
insufficient to justify a formal investigation in most cases, a pattern of 
similar reports or a single report of a particularly serious case of misconduct 
can spur preliminary inquiries.  As one participant explained, “Occasionally 
[inquiries] get started when there is a big exposé of a big problem in a 
department.”217   
 Multiple DOJ litigators identified three examples of cases where outside 
media attention moved the Special Litigation Section to start a preliminary 
inquiry—Los Angeles, Cincinnati, and Washington, D.C.  In Los Angeles, 
 
 209. Telephone Interview with DOJ Participant #14, at 7 (July 11, 2013) [hereinafter 
Interview #14] (on file with Fordham Law Review) (explaining in detail the role that the 
NAACP and the ACLU served in early investigations in cities like Pittsburgh). 
 210. Id. at 7. 
 211. Id. at 4. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. (“That makes very good sense because it’s a huge amount of work to find these 
incidents and to know that you’re talking about something that is systemic enough that there 
is a point to it.”). 
 215. See infra Part III.B (explaining the changes in enforcement policy over time and the 
changing role of these interest groups in the process). 
 216. Telephone Interview with DOJ Participant #18, at 4 (Aug. 8, 2013) [hereinafter 
Interview #18] (on file with Fordham Law Review) (stating that the DOJ identified cases 
“through a mix of . . . media reviews [and] newspaper reviews”). 
 217. Interview #14, supra note 209, at 4 (explaining further that when such a major media 
story breaks, the DOJ will sometimes independently open an inquiry into the matter, or 
leadership from the affected city may come directly to the DOJ requesting assistance). 
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the Rampart scandal made national headlines and, in part, motivated the 
DOJ to take a hard look at the LAPD.218  The Rampart scandal refers to 
allegations that surfaced in the late 1990s that officers working in the 
Rampart station in Los Angeles were involved in numerous illegal activities 
including planting of drugs, making false arrests, and covering up 
brutality.219  This massive scandal led the courts to overturn 106 criminal 
cases and pressured seven officers to retire or resign.220 Similarly, the 
Washington Post featured a prominent news story on a string of shootings 
in Washington, D.C., which motivated the DOJ to make an initial inquiry 
into the Washington Metropolitan Police Department (MPD).221  
Eventually, though, the Washington, D.C., police department came 
proactively to the DOJ seeking help.222  Additionally, in Cincinnati, the 
local media did an “excellent” job making “credible and repeated” 
showings of systemic misconduct by the police department.223  There was 
already an active class action suit against Cincinnati’s police department.224  
And when the shooting of Timothy Thomas, an unarmed teenager, by 
Cincinnati police made national news and “resulted in about 3 days of civil 
 
 218. See Telephone Interview with DOJ Participant #15, at 4 (July 31, 2013) [hereinafter 
Interview #15] (on file with Fordham Law Review) (“The LAPD of course, there had been a 
history of problems.  And then the whole controversy broke out in 2000 or 1999, with the 
Rampart investigation.”); Interview #14, supra note 209, at 4 (identifying Rampart as an 
example of a prominent news story that motivated the DOJ to focus on Los Angeles); see 
also id. (describing how “a big exposé of a big problem” can spur interest in a police agency 
for § 14141 litigation). 
 219. Shawn Hubler, In Rampart, Reaping What We Sowed, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2000, at 
B1 (explaining “the sickening revelations” surrounding the Rampart scandal including “the 
frame-ups, the dope dealing, the tales of brutality verging on murder”).  Other allegations 
include claims that officers arranged the deportation of witnesses to police abuse. Anne-
Marie O’Connor, Activist Says Officer Sought His Deportation, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2000, 
at A1.  The evidence of the Rampart scandal first started to emerge when Rafael Perez, 
former Rampart Division Officer, was arrested for cocaine theft charges. See Kathryn M. 
Downing et al., Editorial, A Scandal Hits Home, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2000, at B8. 
 220. David Rosenzweig, 3 Sue LAPD over Rampart Scandal, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2005, 
at B3 (“More than 100 criminal cases were overturned after former Rampart Officer Rafael 
Perez contended that he and other officers had routinely framed gang members for crimes 
they did not commit.”). 
 221. Interview #15, supra note 218, at 4 (identifying the story in the Washington Post as a 
memorable event that motivated the DOJ to take a deeper look into the District of 
Columbia); Telephone Interview with DOJ Participant #12, at 2 (July 30, 2013) [hereinafter 
Interview #12] (on file with Fordham Law Review) (noting that the interviewee “think[s] the 
Washington Post actually did an exposé on the shootings,” which in part motivated the focus 
on the Metropolitan Police Department). 
 222. Interview #12, supra note 221, at 1–2. 
 223. Id. at 3–4.  The respondent explained in detail that 
if the media brought attention, shed light on allegations, various allegations in a 
community and did those in a credible and repeated fashion, I felt that was more 
powerful than an individual organization or individual complainants calling up. . . .  
[T]hat was certainly the case in Cincinnati.  There was a lot of excellent reporting 
by the newspaper there.  There was a series of shootings of unarmed African 
American men.  A lot of civil unrest . . . happened . . . .  And so, DOJ went in. 
Id. at 4. 
 224. Interview #18, supra note 216, at 2 (“[A]t that point, there had already been an 
ongoing class action lawsuit on racial profiling.”). 
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unrest,” it was important enough to spark DOJ interest in the police 
department’s procedures.225  Indeed, the DOJ appears to rely on media 
reports to initially identify problematic departments. 
Third, research studies sometimes keyed the DOJ into possible instances 
of ongoing unconstitutional policing practices.  According to one 
participant in the qualitative interviews, the investigation of the New Jersey 
State Police demonstrates this phenomenon.226  The DOJ formally opened 
an investigation of the New Jersey State Police on April 15, 1996.227  As 
one DOJ litigator explained, the Special Litigation Section identified the 
New Jersey State Police in part because of research presented in an earlier 
court case on racially disproportionate stop patterns associated with the 
jurisdiction.228  Statistician John Lamberth had started studying racial 
profiling in traffic stops in New Jersey in 1993 after a group of attorneys 
asked Lamberth to investigate a suspicious and racially disparate pattern of 
arrests.229   
Over the following years, Lamberth systematically evaluated whether the 
New Jersey State Police appeared to be targeting drivers of color on state 
highways.230  He began by sampling the racial distribution of drivers on the 
road.231  After twenty-one days of intensive observation, Lamberth 
concluded that roughly 13.5 percent of automobiles on the studied portions 
of New Jersey highway contained at least one black occupant.232  He also 
concluded that these cars with black occupants made up around 15 percent 
of all traffic law violators.233  Yet, about 35 percent of the cars pulled over 
by police during this same time period contained a black occupant.234  
These “findings were central to a March 1996 ruling by Judge Robert E. 
Francis of the Superior Court of New Jersey that the state police were de 
 
 225. Id. (“[W]hen the Timothy Thomas shooting and the subsequent disturbances, some 
people called them riots, happened; then at that point, also the Justice Department began its 
§ 14141 investigation.”); see also POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, CIVIL 
RIGHTS INVESTIGATIONS OF LOCAL POLICE:  LESSONS LEARNED 3 (2013), available at 
http://samuelwalker.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/PERFConsent-Decree.pdf (stating that 
“[i]n Cincinnati, riots were sparked in 2001 by the police killing of Timothy Thomas, a 19-
year-old African American with 14 open warrants for minor, mostly traffic-related 
violations,” and identifying this as a major cause of the eventual DOJ investigation of the 
Cincinnati Police Department). 
 226. Interview #12, supra note 221, at 1–2 (giving an overview of how the DOJ became 
interested in the New Jersey State Police and explaining that “[t]here were maybe tens of 
years of problems reported by minority drivers on the Turnpike in New Jersey and lots of 
civil litigation and lots of allegations of abuse and DOJ used the pattern or practice authority 
to bring the first racial profiling case under that statute”). 
 227. See infra Appendix A (listing the starting and ending dates for each investigation 
initiated by the DOJ). 
 228. Interview #12, supra note 221, at 1–2 (explaining the importance of the academic 
studies in making the DOJ litigators feel more confident in initiating action in New Jersey). 
 229. John Lamberth, Driving While Black:  A Statistician Proves That Prejudice Still 
Rules the Road, WASH. POST, Aug. 16, 1998, at C1. 
 230. Id. 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. 
 233. Id. 
 234. Id. 
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facto targeting blacks, in violation of their rights under the U.S. and New 
Jersey constitutions.”235  The only remedy that the state judge in that 
particular case could provide, however, was the exclusion of evidence 
obtained pursuant to these unlawful stops.236  The judge was not equipped 
to provide a more expansive, injunctive remedy.  According to participants, 
these research findings motivated the DOJ to take action.  Lamberth’s 
evidence was particularly jarring to some at the DOJ.237  It also provided an 
ideal source of evidence to justify a formal investigation.  Within a month 
of the state court judge’s ruling, the DOJ had opened an official 
investigation into the use of race in traffic stops by the New Jersey State 
Police.238 
Fourth, whistleblowers within police departments sometimes provided 
the DOJ with sufficient evidence to bring about a lawsuit.239  This often 
happened when officers “themselves . . . would contact the division and talk 
about problems they had witnessed or problems they, themselves, had 
experienced when they were not in uniform.”240  Interview participants 
could not always give specific examples of this phenomenon because, as 
one explained, “We protect the identity of whistleblowers, so we aren’t able 
to talk more about it.  But needless to say, in a handful of cases, we relied 
heavily on files and information given to us by officers inside a 
department.”241  In other cases, though, a high-level administrator within a 
police department openly reached out to the DOJ to request a formal 
§ 14141 investigation.  This happened, most notably, in Washington, D.C.  
There, 
Charles Ramsey, newly sworn in as chief in Washington’s Metropolitan 
Police Department after a 30-year career in the Chicago Police 
Department, asked the DOJ to intervene after a series of articles in the 
Washington Post alleged that MPD officers shot and killed more people 
per capita in the 1990s than any other large U.S. city police force.242 
Various participants confirmed this story during interviews.243  Although it 
is rare to see a police chief so openly request that the DOJ intervene in local 
 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. 
 237. Interview #12, supra note 221, at 1–2. 
 238. The judge in private litigation found there to be a pattern of unconstitutional stops in 
March 1996. Lamberth, supra note 229.  The next month, in April 1996, the DOJ began a 
formal investigation. See infra Appendix A (listing all dates of investigations). 
 239. Interview #12, supra note 221, at 2 (“[S]ometimes there were internal 
whistleblowers.”). 
 240. Id. 
 241. Id. at 4. 
 242. POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, supra note 225, at 2 (discussing also how this 
proactive response in Washington, D.C., eventually led to a the signing of a memorandum of 
agreement). 
 243. See, e.g., Interview #12, supra note 221, at 1–2 (stating that Chief Ramsey “very 
shrewdly asked DOJ to come in and do an investigation”); Interview #14, supra note 209, at 
4 (“Or they might get started when there’s a big exposé and the department itself or, more 
likely, the mayor responds to that exposé by inviting the Justice Department to come in.  
That’s what happened in D.C.”); Interview #15, supra note 218, at 4 (“I think this was 
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affairs, at least one participant remarked that this type of request happens 
with some frequency.244  In many of these cases, the DOJ cannot find a 
sufficiently serious problem as to warrant intervention and instead 
recommends that the police agency seek alternative assistance through other 
federal programs or through private accreditation agencies.245 
Fifth, in a small number of cases, the DOJ relied on particularly 
egregious individual incidents of misconduct to find possible targets.  Of 
course, § 14141 only provides the attorney general a right of action where 
there is a pattern or practice of misconduct.  This means that a single 
complaint is typically insufficient to further inquiry.246  But a single 
complaint or heinous example of misconduct can influence the DOJ to give 
a police department a harder look via a preliminary inquiry.247  In some 
cases, the Criminal Division of the DOJ sent complaints of officer involved 
shootings directly to the Special Litigation Section for additional 
investigation to determine whether they were part of a pattern or practice of 
misconduct.248  In total, the methods by which the DOJ identifies target 
police departments vary widely.  Similarly, while it normally took several 
examples of systemic misconduct to start an investigation into a police 
department, sometimes a single major event can catch the attention of DOJ 
officials. 
2.  Preliminary Inquiry 
The second step of the structural police reform process is the preliminary 
inquiry.  If a police agency comes to the attention of the DOJ through one 
of the manners listed above, the agency will open a preliminary inquiry into 
that department’s conduct.249  This usually happens when a litigator decides 
 
publicized in the Washington Post, there was a settlement with the D.C. police force and that 
resulted because D.C. actually came to the division and said, we have lots of problems.  We 
want your help.  Please investigate us.”). 
 244. Telephone Interview with DOJ Participant #5, at 2–3 (Sept. 4, 2013) [hereinafter 
Interview #5] (on file with Fordham Law Review) (explaining that police departments come 
to the DOJ requesting assistance more often than many outsider observers may believe). 
 245. Id. (citing Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) and CALEA as possible 
examples of alternative programs that the DOJ may refer a local police agency to in lieu of 
beginning a formal investigation). 
 246. Interview #14, supra note 209, at 4 (explaining that the evidence must show that 
misconduct within a department is systemic enough to justify intervention). 
 247. Interview #18, supra note 216, at 2 (citing the Timothy Thomas shooting as an 
example of a particularly egregious incident of misconduct that motivated DOJ action). 
 248. Id. at 4–5.  This DOJ insider explained the process: 
The criminal section certainly has lots of situations where they’ve had complaints 
about officer-involved shootings where they may have done a set of investigations 
in a particular jurisdiction and said, gee, the policies look pretty bad here.  You 
might want to look at that.  They got—they met with and got—feedback from civil 
rights and community groups. 
Id. at 4. 
 249. Oversight of the Department of Justice—Civil Rights Division:  Hearing Before the 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 18–20 (2002) [hereinafter Oversight of the DOJ] 
(testimony of Ralph Boyd, Jr., Assistant Att’y Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice). 
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to spend more than two hours researching claims of misconduct in a 
particular city.250  During this initial inquiry, the DOJ only relies on private 
complaints, news reports of misconduct, and publicly available data.251  
The DOJ also occasionally conducts interviews with citizens from the 
community.252  During this initial phase, litigators at the DOJ, both past and 
present, are careful to describe their actions as inquiries, as opposed to 
investigations.  This distinction matters, they say, because of the serious 
implications of a formal investigation.  Participants consistently explained 
that by identifying a department as “under investigation,” the DOJ would 
expose that department to immediate criticism in the media.253  Moreover, 
such a decision also triggers a long and expensive investigation.254  Thus, 
the DOJ prefers to only advance a case to the investigatory realm if the 
litigator finds reason to believe the agency is involved in systemic 
misconduct, and the leadership at the Department believes that such an 
investigation would be a worthwhile use of limited resources.255  To 
illustrate the commonality of initial inquiries, the DOJ provided information 
on the number of preliminary inquiries registered into the DOJ database 
since 2000.  I recreate that information below in figure 2, demonstrating the 
progression of cases from preliminary inquiry through investigation, 
settlement, and monitoring. 
  
 
 250. Interview #5, supra note 244, at 2 (explaining the preliminary inquiry process and 
the assignment of a DOJ number for any activity that takes up at least two hours of time). 
 251. Oversight of the DOJ, supra note 249, at 18–19 (explaining how during this phase, 
the DOJ typically relies on public information like witness interviews, pleadings and 
testimony in court). 
 252. Id. (stating that the DOJ will conduct interviews in some cases). 
 253. Interview #14, supra note 209, at 4 (“Opening an investigation is a huge deal.  It’s a 
very big moment.  You wouldn’t want to do that if there turns out not to be enough there to 
investigate.  It would be very detrimental to the police department.  Before you open any 
investigation all through the Department, it doesn’t matter what the issue is, you have to 
figure out if there is a reason to open an investigation.”). 
 254. Jodi Nirode, Doug Caruso & Bob Ruth, City, DOJ Draft Pact; The Police Union 
Will Be Asked To OK Contract Changes To Avoid Suit Over, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Aug. 17, 
1999, at A1 (stating that in a request for the 2000 budget, the DOJ requested $100 million 
per year to fund sixteen new investigators annually, putting the estimated cost at around $6 
million to $7 million per investigator hired). 
 255. Interview #14, supra note 209, at 5 (calling this preliminary investigation a “sussing 
out exercise” used when the DOJ has a suspicion but otherwise has “nothing”). 
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FIGURE 2.  TOTAL NUMBER OF INQUIRIES, INVESTIGATIONS, AND MONITOR 
APPOINTMENTS FROM JANUARY 1, 2000, TO SEPTEMBER 1, 2013256 
Stage Cases 
Preliminary Inquiry 325 cases 
Formal Investigation 38 cases 
Negotiated Settlement 19 cases 
Monitor Appointed 9 cases 
 
As figure 2 shows, with 325 total cases between 2000 and 2013, the DOJ 
has initiated an average of around twenty-five or twenty-six preliminary 
inquiries per year since 2000.257  The vast majority of these preliminary 
looks fail to become a formal investigation.  In fact, only 11.6 percent of 
preliminary inquiries resulted in a formal investigation.  Only 5.8 percent 
ended up leading to a negotiated settlement.  And in only 2.8 percent of all 
cases did a preliminary inquiry eventually result in a monitored settlement. 
3.  Formal Investigation 
If this initial inquiry uncovers the possibility of persistent misconduct in 
a police department, the DOJ may conduct a formal investigation.  These 
are particularly costly endeavors.  In 2000, the DOJ requested $100 million 
in additional funding to expand the number of police department 
investigations under § 14141.258  This increase in funding was supposed to 
hire an additional sixteen new investigators each year—suggesting that 
investigations are a costly endeavor.259  The average investigation “can take 
years as investigators wade through piles of internal records and personnel 
files.”260  Other previous reports suggested that investigations took “as long 
as a year.”261  Such a slow pace can frustrate police agencies that complain 
that federal investigation contributes to a cloud of suspicion over the entire 
department.262  Full investigations are “comprehensive and far-
 
 256. I acquired this data from an interview participant with access to DOJ records.  The 
number of preliminary inquiries is approximate, since the Special Litigation Section does not 
always keep complete records of these inquiries.  The participant explained that the number 
could be anywhere between 300 and 350.  Hence, I use 325 as the best approximate estimate. 
Interview #5, supra note 244. 
 257. I calculated this by dividing the total number of preliminary inquiries (325) by the 
number of years in the sample (12.67) to arrive at an average of 25.66 preliminary inquiries 
per year since 2000. 
 258. Nirode, Caruso & Ruth, supra note 254. 
 259. Id. 
 260. Jamie Stockwell, Rights Investigation of Police Continues, WASH. POST, Dec. 22, 
2002, at C6. 
 261. David Hench, City Police To Get Federal Review, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, May 8, 
2002, at 1A. 
 262. Stockwell, supra note 260. 
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reaching.”263  In carrying out an investigation, the DOJ takes “inventory of 
departmental policies and procedures related to training, discipline, routine 
police activities, and uses of force and conduct[s] in-depth interviews to 
determine whether the department’s practices adhere to formal policies.”264  
Litigators from the DOJ do not do these investigations by themselves; 
instead, they outsource much of the work to police experts and 
professionals.265  These police experts “go out and do ride alongs with the 
police department, to review the police policy manuals, [and] to observe 
police training.”266  These experts also evaluate current agency procedure 
for investigation and commonly “look into and review investigations, both 
citizen complaints and use of force investigations.”267  Investigations are 
primarily comparative—that is the DOJ seeks to compare the policies in the 
investigated department with “constitutional minimums.”268  In theory, if an 
investigation reveals a pattern or practice of misconduct, and the agency 
refuses to cooperate, the case could go to trial.269  In the vast majority of 
cases, departments are eager to cooperate with the investigation to avoid the 
expense and embarrassment of public litigation.270 
A Washington, D.C., case provides a useful example of a typical 
investigation.  When the DOJ formally investigated the Washington, D.C., 
MPD for allegations of excessive use of force, DOJ investigators obtained a 
“stratified random sample of the use of force incidents.”271  They 
determined that in approximately 15 percent of these cases, the officer used 
 
 263. Harmon, supra note 4, at 15 (quoting INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, PROTECTING 
CIVIL RIGHTS:  A LEADERSHIP GUIDE FOR STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL LAW ENFORCEMENT 38 
(2006), available at http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/files/ric/Publications/e06064100.pdf). 
 264. Id.; see also INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, supra note 263, at 8. 
 265. Interview #18, supra note 216, at 7 (“[T]he Civil Rights Division and the Special 
Litigation Section brings on police experts to assist them in the actual investigation.”).  This 
participant further elaborated on how the DOJ selects individuals for this role: 
Some individuals are—many of them are—prior chiefs or prior deputy chiefs or 
involved in maybe heads of internal affairs divisions, some may be academics but I 
don’t think so.  I think they’re mostly practitioners.  There’s also been some kind 
of going back and forth between monitors and the folks who do the investigation. 
Id. at 8. 
 266. Id. at 7. 
 267. Id. 
 268. Id.  This participant’s full explanation is worth reproduction here to give a fuller 
explanation of the investigatory process: 
And then to look into and review investigations, both citizen complaints and use of 
force investigations.  That’s one of the ways that they compare the police 
departments or it could be a sheriff or a law enforcement jurisdiction entity.  They 
compare the practices of the investigating—the entity being investigated—with 
general police practices, model practices and what the expectation[s] are in the 
field.  And review the practices for comparison to constitutional minimums.  And 
as part of the investigation, they examine the systems, the policies, the practices, 
and the policy systems, compare it to what should be the norm. 
Id. 
 269. Harmon, supra note 4, at 15. 
 270. See infra Appendix B (listing the disposition of each negotiated settlement). 
 271. WILLIAM R. YEOMANS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE INVESTIGATION OF USE OF 
FORCE BY THE WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT 2 (2001), available at 
http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PN-DC-0001-0002.pdf. 
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excessive force.272  According to DOJ estimates, a “well-managed and 
supervised police department[]” should only expect about 1 or 2 percent of 
all incidents to involve excessive use of force.273  The survey also found 
that in 22 percent of the force claims involving firearms, police used deadly 
force based on the suspicion that the suspect possessed a firearm.274  And 
“[i]n each case . . . post-incident searches failed to reveal any weapon.”275  
Based on these findings, the DOJ provided the MPD with a set of technical 
assistance recommendations.276  In some cases—particularly those 
involving a small number of problems—this investigation and technical 
assistance letter ends the DOJ inquiry.277  If the formal investigation 
uncovers a more expansive pattern of misconduct, though, the DOJ could 
theoretically file a lawsuit under § 14141.  But in practice, no § 14141 case 
has ever gone to trial. 
This three-step process of internal, investigatory action by the DOJ sets 
the stage for structural police reform.  It determines which departments are 
subject to long, costly litigation, and it determines which departments get a 
pass on federal oversight.  The DOJ is the gatekeeper to the structural police 
reform process.  While it remains possible that private litigants can initiate 
structural police reform in a few narrow circumstances after Lyons, the DOJ 
holds the key to virtually all structural police reform cases.  In many 
respects, the current enforcement model makes sense.  It attempts to use 
limited resources to identify and investigate a small number of police 
departments out of a pool of thousands of possible targets.  But in doing so, 
it uses an imprecise and messy process.  And, as I show in the next section, 
the agency’s enforcement model has also changed over time. 
B.  Changes in Enforcement Policy over Time 
In the past, several writers have claimed that both internal and external 
pressures may affect how aggressively the DOJ pursues cases under 
§ 14141.  Professor Chanin has previously written that the DOJ’s 
enforcement strategy seemed to “change[] considerably after the elections 
of George W. Bush and Barack Obama.”278  This seems to roughly align 
 
 272. Id. 
 273. Id. 
 274. Id. (“22 percent of the sampled incidents involved officers firing their weapons at 
moving vehicles.”). 
 275. Id. 
 276. Id. at 7 (citing the need for a formal settlement outlining the terms of reform and 
saying that “[t]he Memorandum of Agreement provides for the development and 
implementation of updated use of force policies and procedures addressing the issues raised 
by our investigation as summarized above”). 
 277. Harmon, supra note 4, at 16 (writing that in some cases, the DOJ has “issued a 
technical assistance letter recommending reform, or taken no action”). 
 278. Chanin, supra note 16, at 334–35.  Heather Mac Donald, arguing from the 
conservative standpoint, echoes the view that President Bush’s DOJ restricted the number of 
investigations:  “During the Bush Administration, political appointees to the civil rights 
division reined in the staff’s eagerness to investigate police departments for racial profiling, 
since the profiling studies routinely served up by the ACLU and other activist organizations 
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with statements made by then candidate George W. Bush as he was 
campaigning for his first presidential term, when he stated that he did “not 
believe that the federal government should instruct state and local 
authorities on how police department operations should be conducted, 
becoming a separate internal affairs division.”279  This stands in stark 
contrast to the Obama Administration, which has pledged to take on a more 
aggressive enforcement posture.  Under President Obama, Assistant 
Attorney General Thomas Perez “told a conference of police chiefs in June 
2010 that the Justice Department would be pursuing ‘pattern or practice’ 
takeovers of police departments much more aggressively than the Bush 
Administration, eschewing negotiation in favor of hardball tactics seeking 
immediate federal control.”280  In many respects, there seems to be 
something to the notion that the politics affects the § 14141 enforcement 
strategy.  During the Clinton Administration, the DOJ sought millions of 
dollars in additional funds to support § 14141 investigations.281  And during 
the Obama Administration, the DOJ has added nine additional attorneys to 
facilitate § 14141 enforcement.282 
But despite many researchers levying theories about changes in 
enforcement, no study has empirically assessed the validity of these claims.  
Has § 14141 enforcement changed under different political leadership?283  
To examine the change in enforcement over time, I utilize a combination of 
quantitative and qualitative measures.  Quantitatively, I acquired from the 
DOJ a complete listing of all formal investigations and settlements pursuant 
to § 14141 since the law’s passage in 1994.  To my knowledge, this is the 
first time that any researcher has gained access to a complete list of all 
internal investigatory action on structural police reform cases by the DOJ.  
This data, viewable in Appendices A and B, includes the dates that the DOJ 
opened each investigation, agreed to a settlement, and closed each case.  
Based on this data, I show that the DOJ’s enforcement of § 14141 is both 
limited and inconsistent.  Qualitatively, I conducted semistructured 
interviews with thirty participants involved in the § 14141 reform process—
including attorneys who currently or previously worked at the DOJ and 
have intimate knowledge about the internal workings of the Special 
Litigation Section.  Other interviewees include independent monitors, DOJ 
investigators, city officials involved in the negotiation of § 14141 
 
were based on laughably bogus methodology.” Heather Mac Donald, Targeting the Police, 
WKLY. STANDARD, Jan. 31, 2011, at 26. 
 279. See Eric Lichtblau, Bush Sees U.S. As Meddling in Local Police Affairs, L.A. TIMES, 
June 1, 2000, at A5. 
 280. Mac Donald, supra note 278. 
 281. Nirode, Caruso & Ruth, supra note 254. 
 282. Mac Donald, supra note 278. 
 283. The studies that have alluded to this question have cursorily addressed it by piecing 
together an answer by relying on interviews, media reports, and news releases. See, e.g., 
Gilles, supra note 14, at 1404–10 (turning to publicly available information to piece together 
data on the DOJ’s enforcement policies); Simmons, supra note 14, at 516–17 (describing the 
lack of aggressive DOJ enforcement through reliance on media reports and publicly 
available information); Chanin, supra note 16, at 24 (describing the use of monitor reports, 
publicly available data, news reports, and interviews to acquire data). 
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settlements, police administrators, and other relevant stakeholders in the 
§ 14141 litigation process.  These interviewees, by and large, requested 
anonymity, given their continued role in this sensitive process.  These 
interviewees confirm that the DOJ lacks the necessary resources to respond 
to every case of apparent systemic misconduct within a police department. 
These interviewees also attribute the inconsistency in the enforcement of 
§ 14141 to change in internal policies. 
First, the data clearly shows that the DOJ has not aggressively pursued 
structural police reform against a large number of police agencies.  In total, 
the DOJ has initiated around fifty-five investigations since the passage of § 
14141.  This means that the DOJ has only formally investigated around 
three departments per year.284  The relatively small number of 
investigations appears to be a product of the high cost of each investigation.  
Remember, investigations are costly285 and can last for several years.286  As 
a result, the DOJ can only target a small number of cities each year.  Given 
that there are around 17,985 state and local police agencies in the United 
States,287 this means the DOJ can only investigate less than 0.02 percent of 
all departments in the country each year.  If patterns or practices of 
misconduct exist in only one out of every 100 law enforcement 
departments,288 then the DOJ only has the resources to investigate less than 
2 percent of these departments each year.  It is fair to assume that, even 
during the times when the DOJ has aggressively pursued pattern or practice 
claims, enforcement has still been less than optimal.  As one litigator with 
the DOJ explained during an interview, “there’s no way that the [DOJ] can 
litigate all of the patterns and practices of police misconduct in this country.  
There are too many policing jurisdictions for them to do that.”289  In fact, a 
single, complex § 14141 case alone can nearly exhaust all of the manpower 
and resources of the Special Litigation Section for an entire year.290  It is 
likely that the resources given to the DOJ to investigate § 14141 abuse may 
never be sufficient to target every city apparently engaged in misconduct. 
This is a particularly troubling realization, since only through increasing 
the frequency of investigations can § 14141 efficiently incentivize 
 
 284. I calculated this by taking the number of investigations reported by the DOJ in 
Appendix A and dividing it by the time period covered—approximately eighteen years. This 
results in an average of approximately three investigations per year. 
 285. Nirode, Caruso & Ruth, supra note 254. 
 286. Stockwell, supra note 260. 
 287. REAVES, supra note 21, at 2 tbl.1. 
 288. Unfortunately, there is no good way estimate the number of police departments that 
may be engaged in a pattern or practice of misconduct.  There is no uniform statistic to 
measure misconduct—which is part of the reason why the DOJ has developed such a unique 
and multifaceted case selection method for § 14141 cases. See supra Part III.A.i. 
 289. Interview #14, supra note 209, at 11.  The participant referenced the hard work 
required in litigating the ongoing case in Maricopa County and further elaborated that even 
though the Special Litigation Section now has more lawyers than in the past “it’s not 
plausible to think that the [DOJ] can do this by itself.” Id. at 12. 
 290. Id. at 11–12 (using Maricopa County as an example of a particularly complex and 
contentious claim that has exhausted significant resources, leaving little left to address other 
cities). 
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widespread reform and generally deter unconstitutional misconduct.  
Structural police reform has the potential to be the most forceful regulatory 
tool for overhauling American police departments when used aggressively 
by the DOJ.  Unlike traditional cost-raising mechanisms for misconduct 
regulation, § 14141 can force noncompliant departments to implement 
radical reforms to ensure constitutional policing practices.291  But § 14141 
cannot achieve this objective if the DOJ chooses not to invoke the statute’s 
protections.  In theory, the statute can only deter misconduct in one of two 
ways—either it can specifically reform a single problematic department 
through costly and invasive equitable relief, or it can serve as a general 
deterrent to police departments all across the country, thereby motivating 
departments to take proactive steps to avoid the cost and embarrassment of 
DOJ scrutiny. 
For this general deterrent rationale to work, police agencies must 
perceive the possibility of DOJ investigation and oversight as reasonably 
possible, if not certain.  If agencies view DOJ action under § 14141 to be an 
extremely remote possibility, then rational choice theory suggests that these 
departments will have no motivation for reform.  Rachel Harmon has used 
such rational choice theory in arguing for a new DOJ enforcement model 
that is more transparent.292  As it currently stands, a rational department 
engaged in systemic misconduct would likely not view a § 14141 suit as a 
realistic possibility.  If this law is to be an incentive for widespread reform, 
this must change. 
Second, the data shows that the DOJ’s enforcement of § 14141 has also 
changed over time.  Since commentators previously observed that § 14141 
enforcement seemed to vary by presidential administration, figure 3 
organizes the total number of investigations and negotiated settlements 
reached during each presidential administration. 
  
 
 291. See supra Part I.B (explaining the comparative advantage of equitable relief 
compared to traditional cost-raising measures). 
 292. Harmon, supra note 4, at 23 (“According to deterrence theory, a rational actor will 
engage in conduct when doing so provides a positive expected return in light of the actor’s 
utility function . . . [meaning that] a police department will adopt remedial measures to 
prevent misconduct when doing so is a cost-effective means of reducing the net costs of 
police misconduct or increasing the net benefits of protecting civil rights.”). 
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FIGURE 3.  DOJ ACTION UNDER § 14141 BY PRESIDENTIAL 
ADMINISTRATION293 
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The data shows a decrease in the aggressiveness of § 14141 enforcement 
between late 2004 and early 2009, which correlates with the second term of 
the Bush Administration.295  This decrease in aggressiveness manifests 
itself in several ways.  During this time period, there was a noticeable 
decrease in the number of investigations officially opened by the DOJ.  The 
DOJ did not enter into a single negotiated settlement during this time 
period.  And since the DOJ did not agree to any settlements during this time 
period, they also did not push for the monitoring of any police agency.  
Remember that part of the reason that Congress passed § 14141 in 1994 
was to provide the DOJ with the ability to seek injunctive action against 
police departments—that is, force those police departments to make 
necessary policy changes aimed at curbing misconduct.296  During the 
 
 293. See Appendices A–B. 
 294. Section 14141 became law in 1991.  The lack of negotiated settlements and monitor 
appointments before 1997 probably does not represent any administrative unwillingness to 
use these remedies.  After § 14141’s passage, the DOJ needed time to develop internal 
implementation strategies after the passage of § 14141.  Enforcement was not fully 
underway until about a year after Congress passed the VCCLEA.  See, e.g., Interview #14, 
supra note 209, at 5 (stating that “it’s hard getting a new statute implemented” and detailing 
the challenging process facing the DOJ in implementing the statute initially in 1994 and 
1995).  This likely explains the lack of negotiated settlements and monitor appointments 
during the first Clinton Administration. 
 295. It is possible that any effects of political administration on the enforcement policy of 
the DOJ would only be felt a year or more after a change in executive leadership. See, e.g., 
Interview #14, supra note 209, at 5–6 (explaining the time it took to get policies 
implemented and the possibility of lagged effects of implementation); Interview #15, supra 
note 218, at 2 (explaining that while the statute was not initially enforced, it took a period of 
time for internal changes to lead to efforts to change enforcement policy).  But even when 
controlling for this possibility, there still appeared to be a noticeable difference in the 
likelihood of the DOJ to aggressively utilize § 14141 around the second term of the Bush 
Administration. 
 296. See infra Parts I.D–II (explaining the need for equitable relief to address systemic 
misconduct issues). 
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second term of the Bush Administration, though, the DOJ did not force a 
single police agency to make any policy changes via a § 14141 settlement.  
The noticeable shift in enforcement is also visible in Figure 4, which shows 
the number of open § 14141 cases over time. 














So what caused this apparent shift in enforcement of § 14141?  One 
experienced DOJ litigator, who left the DOJ around this time, attributed this 
sharp decline in negotiated settlements to changes in an internal policy that 
discouraged extensive federal involvement in local police departments.298  
Respondents identified two possible explanations for this change in 
enforcement policy.  First, as one DOJ official detailed, DOJ litigators have 
often relied on coordination with civil rights groups like the ACLU and 
NAACP to determine whether there was sufficient evidence to justify a 
formal investigation.299  Remember that, in many cases, coordination with 
civil rights groups formed the basis for initial inquiries and served as a vital 
tool for evidence during the formal investigation stage.300  Litigators 
continued this method of preliminary inquiry in the early years of the Bush 
Administration.301  But at some point during the Bush Administration, an 
internal policy change allegedly discouraged litigators from coordinating 
with civil rights groups.302  This hampered efforts by § 14141 litigators to 
acquire sufficient evidence to justify invasive federal involvement in local 
police affairs. 
 
 297. This data is taken from the list of investigations. See Appendix A. 
 298. Interview #15, supra note 218, at 6 (explaining the changes that happened during the 
Bush Administration).  One important change that this participant noted was the removal of 
the previous leadership within the Special Litigation Section in part because of “his police-
related work and the opposition of police unions to the work.  Which was very strong.” Id. 
 299. Interview #5, supra note 244, at 2–3 (explaining the policy that discouraged or even 
barred the coordination with civil rights groups). 
 300. See supra Part III.A.1 (describing the case selection process and in particular the 
coordination with groups like the NAACP and the ACLU). 
 301. See supra Part III.A.1. 
 302. See supra Part III.A.1. 
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Second, multiple current and former DOJ litigators noted that internal 
politics around this same time favored the use of § 14141 for technical 
assistance as opposed to full-scale negotiated settlements and external 
monitoring.303  The prevailing belief was that technical assistance letters 
could provide departments with the necessary guidance to reform 
departments locally, without expending additional federal resources 
monitoring eventual reform efforts.304  Of course, these technical assistance 
letters are not binding.305  Instead, these technical assistance letters only 
provide a voluntary blueprint that agencies can accept if they so choose.  
These apparent policy changes could explain a substantial amount of the 
variation in enforcement patterns evident from the data. 
In recent years, the DOJ has again started to use § 14141 more 
aggressively to force police departments to adopt specific policy reforms.306  
In March 2009, less than two months after Eric Holder took over as 
attorney general, the DOJ approved a consent decree with the Virgin Islands 
Police Department.307  This was the first negotiated settlement that the DOJ 
had approved under § 14141 in over five years.308  Since then, the DOJ has 
reached settlement agreements with seven different police agencies in seven 
different states.309  In three of these cases—the Virgin Islands; Seattle, 
Washington; and New Orleans, Louisiana—these settlements have included 
clauses that require the appointment of an external monitor to ensure 
departmental compliance with the terms of the agreement.310 
In sum, the qualitative and quantitative data suggest that the enforcement 
of § 14141 varied significantly during a portion of the Bush Administration, 
 
 303. See supra Part III.A.1. Harmon also provides a useful perspective: 
The technical assistance letters or investigative findings letters represent less 
formal attempts by the Justice Department to achieve reform.  During most of the 
Justice Department’s investigations, it has sent a letter to the investigated police 
department summarizing its findings at that point in the investigation.  In some 
cases, this letter functioned as a precursor to a later settlement through a consent 
decree or memorandum of agreement.  In other cases—although the letter 
suggested that the investigation was ongoing at the time—the technical assistance 
letter was the last public action in the case.  In these cases, the letters do not make 
findings about whether § 14141 has been violated. Instead, they describe 
departmental deficiencies that may cause misconduct and recommend specific 
remedial measures to correct those problems. 
Harmon, supra note 4, at 17–18. 
 304. Interview #5, supra note 244, at 3 (detailing the preference for technical assistance 
letters); see also Harmon, supra note 4, at 18 (“[T]he letters do not contain any mechanism 
for ensuring compliance or for ongoing monitoring.”). 
 305. Interview #5, supra note 244, at 3. 
 306. One way to measure this is to examine the number of investigations per year since 
President Obama’s pick for attorney general—Eric Holder—has assumed office.  Holder has 
served as attorney general for 1,687 days as of September 9, 2013.  During this time, the 
DOJ initiated fifteen investigations. See Appendix A.  This suggests that the Holder DOJ has 
averaged approximately 3.25 investigations per 365 days. 
 307. See Appendix B (detailing the dates of each negotiated settlement reached between 
the DOJ and local police agencies). 
 308. See Appendix B. 
 309. See Appendix B. 
 310. See Appendix B. 
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likely due in part to the adoption of internal policies that discouraged 
coordination with interest groups and encouraged noninvasive solutions.  
The Obama Administration has, meanwhile, appeared to reverse this trend, 
ushering in a new era of aggressive enforcement.  The evidence also 
suggests, however, that even when internal policies favor aggressive 
enforcement of § 14141, the DOJ has only initiated around three new 
investigations per year.  Interviewees argued that this number represented 
only a fraction of departments seemingly engaged in systemic misconduct. 
C.  Political Spillover 
The qualitative evidence also suggests that the DOJ faces another 
potential barrier in initiating action against a municipality that may be 
engaged in patterns or practices of misconduct—a challenge I refer to as 
“political spillover.”  An example best illustrates this phenomenon.  
Multiple interviewees described the Special Litigation Section’s interest in 
pursuing a possible structural police reform case against the New York City 
Police Department (NYPD).311  The DOJ initiated two separate 
investigations in New York City—one through the U.S. Attorney’s Office 
(USAO) in the Eastern District of New York and one through the USAO in 
the Southern District of New York.312  Neither investigation resulted in a 
settlement agreement.313  When asked about this investigation into the 
NYPD, DOJ litigators suggested that political considerations factored into 
the decision to not formally pursue a settlement agreement.  Before the DOJ 
initiates settlement negotiations under § 14141, the Special Litigation 
Section relies on the local USAO to facilitate the investigation and to 
participate in the settlement negotiation.  In New York, this meant that the 
Special Litigation Section needed to work collaboratively with the USAO 
in the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York.  According to 
interviewees, these two USAO districts are unique in their independence 
from the central DOJ.314  Interviewees jokingly referred to the Southern 
District as the “Sovereign District of New York,” a tribute to the district’s 
informal jurisdictional independence from the central authority of the 
DOJ.315  Although litigators in the Special Litigation Section felt that a 
negotiated settlement was needed to address the possible misconduct in the 
NYPD, multiple interviewees identified the Southern District as a barrier to 
 
 311. Interview #14, supra note 209, at 11–14 (identifying, again, NYPD as an agency of 
interest to the Special Litigation Section for § 14141 purposes); Interview #18, supra note 
216, at 5–7 (explaining the initiation of the New York investigation). 
 312. See Appendix A (listing all of the investigations pursued by the DOJ). 
 313. See Appendix B (showing that the NYPD is not among the list of settlement 
agreements). 
 314. Interview #18, supra note 216, at 6 (identifying the unique independence of the 
Southern District in particular); see also Interview #14, supra note 209, at 12 (“The Eastern 
District is sort of quasi-sovereign.”). 
 315. Interview #14, supra note 209, at 12; Interview #18, supra note 216, at 6 (identifying 
the independence of the Southern District and stating that “they do all their cases including 
their civil rights cases”). 
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§ 14141 action.316  Since New York City spans two different USAO 
districts, the DOJ needed to get the support of both the Southern and 
Eastern District offices.317  While the Eastern District seemed somewhat 
willing to pursue the matter further, the Southern District resisted efforts to 
push further any § 14141 claims against the NYPD.318  Interviewees 
disagreed about the extent to which politics factored into the decision by the 
Southern District to block further action against the NYPD.  At least two 
participants concluded that politics played some role in the decision to not 
pursue a § 14141 case against the NYPD.319  One former litigator believed 
that the DOJ made a tactical choice to not initiate action against the NYPD 
because of concerns about alienating the agency, thereby hampering future 
efforts to coordinate as part of law enforcement task forces.320  As this 
litigator went on to speculate, federal-state coordination is an increasingly 
important method for addressing law enforcement issues that traverse 
jurisdictional borders.321  And perhaps no local department engages in more 
federal-state coordination than the NYPD.322  This suggests that internal 
politics can also serve as a barrier to DOJ action, in some cases.323  After 
all, the DOJ is the ultimate “repeat player.”324  And as a repeat player in the 
legal system, the DOJ must be cognizant of how its actions in one arena 
may affect its future ability to further other, future organizational goals.  
The result is political spillover that can hamper otherwise viable efforts to 
enforce § 14141. 
 
 316. Interview #14, supra note 209, at 12–13 (identifying the political concerns that likely 
motivated the Southern District to oppose formal action); Interview #18, supra note 216, at 6 
(explaining that the Southern District was the agency most opposed to further action against 
the NYPD). 
 317. Interview #18, supra note 216, at 6 (“[I]n order to bring a case against the city, the 
police department covers all of the boroughs so you’d have to get both US Attorneys on 
board.”). 
 318. Id. at 6 (identifying the differing opinions between the Eastern and Southern 
Districts). 
 319. Interview #14, supra note 209, at 12–13 (speculating that the political ambitions of 
the U.S. Attorney of the Southern District of New York may have contributed to the 
unwillingness to pursue further civil rights actions); see also Interview #12, supra note 221, 
at 3 (agreeing during the interview that local politics likely play an important role in the 
decision to pursue further action under § 14141). 
 320. Telephone Interview with DOJ Participant #22 (Sept. 19, 2013). 
 321. Id. 
 322. Id. 
 323. Several studies have found that this sort of political spillover can affect agency 
aggressiveness. Matthew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement:  The 
Case for Expanding the Role of Administrative Agencies, 91 VA. L. REV. 93, 110 & n.48 
(describing studies that show the link between politics and “agency slack”). 
 324. See generally Marc Galanter, Why the Haves Come Out Ahead:  Speculations on the 
Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974).  Galanter distinguishes between 
“repeat players” (those who are engaged in multiple similar litigations over time) and “one 
shotters” (those who litigate only on rare occasions). Id. at 98–104.  Since repeat players are 
engaged in the same type of litigation time and time again, their goals are different than a 
one shotter. Id. at 100.  The repeat player wants to establish valuable precedent that will be 
of use in future cases. Id. 
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IV.  IMPLICATIONS AND AVENUES FOR FUTURE REFORM 
The results of this study have implications for the study of public rights 
of action and for the viability of § 14141 as an effective means of 
combating police misconduct.  Structural reform litigation relies on 
statutory language authorizing public rights of action to be initiated by the 
executive branch.  These findings suggest that, in such cases, the executive 
branch can easily mediate the impact of ambiguous statutory authorizations.  
In Part IV.A, I situate this study in the broader literature on importance of 
public rights of action. 
In Part. IV.B, I evaluate possible ways to ameliorate some of the 
problems with § 14141 uncovered in this study.  To help improve the 
federal enforcement of § 14141, I make two normative recommendations.  
First, I argue that the DOJ should adopt a more transparent case selection 
process that incentivizes local law enforcement agencies to reform 
proactively.  Second, I argue that state and national policymakers should 
take steps to increase the number of structural police reform cases.  I outline 
and evaluate two possible ways that policymakers could do this.  Congress 
could expand § 14141 to include a limited private right of action.  In theory, 
such an effort could ensure a more expansive enforcement of injunctive 
measures against policing agencies engaged in systemic misconduct.  Such 
a grant of power to private litigants could also be reasonably limited so as 
to prevent private parties from interfering with legitimate DOJ 
investigations under § 14141.  But ultimately such an expansion of § 14141 
would be constitutionally questionable after Lyons.  Thus, an alternative 
method for increasing the number of structural police reform cases would 
be for state legislators to pass legislation permitting state attorneys general 
to initiate structural police reform in state court. 
A.  Implications for the Utility of a Public Right of Action 
Over the last several decades, law scholars have observed that privately 
initiated structural reform litigation had fallen out of favor with the courts.  
For a period of time during the twentieth century, private litigants were able 
to successfully instigate structural reform of many major state 
institutions.325  For several decades after, the courts were “cast” in a 
 
 325. Gilles, supra note 14, at 1390 (explaining how the modern structural reform 
movement through private litigation began in the 1950s as the federal courts agreed to hear 
cases alleging the need for equitable relief for various public institutions like schools and 
prisons).  There are numerous prominent cases from the mid-twentieth century of the courts 
proactively instigating structural reform. See, e.g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978) 
(holding that punitive isolation for longer than thirty days in an Arkansas prison constituted 
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment); Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (determining that once a locality had violated 
a court mandate to desegregate schools, the district court had broad and flexible power to 
remedy the wrong through equitable relief); Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294 
(1955) (holding that the problems identified in the Court’s original opinion, Brown v. Bd. of 
Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483 (1954), required multiple different, local solutions; thus Chief 
Justice Warren urged localities to act “with all deliberate speed” to comply with the Court’s 
order). 
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“political” or “activist” role.326  Scholars who supported this expansive role 
of the courts in structural reform praised this activist structural reform as 
promising to be “the central . . . mode of constitutional adjudication” of the 
future.327  But in recent decades, “a number of events signaled the demise 
of the structural reform revolution.”328 
Professor Myriam Gilles provides an excellent summary of the gradual 
erosion of structural reform litigation as a viable option for remedying 
constitutional violations, explaining how the Court slowly started to set 
aside desegregation decrees and uphold controversial prison conditions.329  
Changes to procedural rules also made it more difficult for litigants to 
initiate suits for structural reform.  During this time, the Court not only has 
“denied standing to plaintiffs who, it claimed, failed to meet the 
requirements of causation, redressability, and injury-in-fact,” it also 
substantially limited the types of litigants that have standing to pursue 
injunctive relief.330  These major changes in recent decades have made 
individual-initiated structural reform litigation challenging and rare.  In its 
place, aggrieved parties have relied on a series of federal statutes that give 
the attorney general authority to seek injunctive relief through public 
litigation to address a range of issues.331  Since then, the DOJ has brought 
public litigation claims for a host of different issues—school 
desegregation,332 public housing,333 employment discrimination,334 prison 
conditions,335 and more.  But the executive branch—most often the attorney 
general—must first initiate this type of public structural reform litigation. 
The empirical evidence from this study suggests that the attorney general 
has not consistently and aggressively enforced § 14141.  This confirms the 
suspicion of many earlier writers that “the frequency of § 14141 actions 
will likely depend upon the political ideology and commitment of the 
 
 326. Abram Chayes, The Supreme Court, 1981 Term, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1, 4 (1982). 
 327. Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2 (1979). 
 328. Gilles, supra note 14, at 1393. 
 329. Id. at 1394–99. 
 330. Id. at 1396; see also Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 757, 760 (1984) (holding that 
the courts are “‘not the proper forum to press’ general complaints about the way in which 
government goes about its business” (quoting City of L.A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 112 
(1983))). 
 331. Gilles, supra note 14, at 1402 (“The provision granting the Attorney General 
standing to seek injunctive relief substantially enhances the Justice Department’s authority 
with regard to local police affairs by affording the Civil Rights Division a statutory basis for 
intervening in police ‘pattern or practices’ in ways analogous to statutes that have authorized 
federal government intervention in other spheres.”). 
 332. Id. at 1402 n.69 (“Many school desegregation cases were brought under 
authorization of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 407, 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-6 (1994). . . .  [And 
this] authorizes the Attorney General to sue on behalf of public school or college students for 
the purpose of assuring their Fourteenth Amendment rights and ‘the orderly achievement of 
desegregation in public education.’” (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-6 (1994)). 
 333. Id. at 1402 n.71 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 3614(a)). 
 334. Id. at 1402 n.70 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(c)). 
 335. Id. at 1402 (citing prison conditions as one of the sources of public litigation). 
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President of the United States.”336  This uneven enforcement further 
“underscores the fact that giving the Justice Department such authority will 
not ensure meaningful federal enforcement.”337  At least one writer has 
previously shown this phenomenon in the context of the Reagan 
Administration’s enforcement of the Civil Rights of Institutionalized 
Persons Act (CRIPA).338  There, the Reagan Administration did not “file a 
single suit involving an institution” subject to potential litigation under 
CRIPA.339  The DOJ made a policy of only initiating litigation as a last 
resort, opting instead to give states seemingly “unlimited time to negotiate a 
settlement” while the unconstitutional practices “fester[ed], destroying the 
purpose of the federally mandated intervention.”340  The DOJ also generally 
avoided injunctive relief,341 and also chose to not assign independent 
monitors to oversee the reforms.342  Thus, Reagan’s DOJ transformed 
CRIPA from a measure designed by Congress to facilitate widespread 
reform of facilities housing institutionalized persons into a weak measure 
that failed to provide for effective relief.343  Other researchers have also 
identified how political pressure can affect agency enforcement.344 
Similarly, the empirical evidence I present in this Article adds to this 
body of work.  It demonstrates that by giving the DOJ a broad and 
ambiguous mandate, Congress opened up the opportunity for the DOJ to 
limit the law’s effectiveness.  Statutes “tend to set forth broad and often 
ambiguous principles that give organizations wide latitude to construct the 
meaning of compliance in a way that responds to both environmental 
demands and managerial interests.”345  The danger in doing so is that 
 
 336. Marshall Miller, Police Brutality, 17 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 149, 176 (1998) 
(hypothesizing on the future use of § 14141). 
 337. Paul Hoffman, The Feds, Lies, and Videotape:  The Need for an Effective Federal 
Role in Controlling Police Abuse in Urban America, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1453, 1524 n.279 
(1993). 
 338. Id.; see also John Kip Cornwell, CRIPA:  The Failure of Federal Intervention for 
Mentally Retarded People, 97 YALE L.J. 845 (1988) (finding that the Reagan 
Administration’s DOJ avoided litigation under CRIPA and authored inadequate settlements). 
 339. Cornwell, supra note 338, at 848. 
 340. Id. at 849 (quoting STAFF OF S. SUBCOMM. ON THE HANDICAPPED, 99TH CONG., REP. 
ON THE INSTITUTIONALIZED MENTALLY DISABLED 6 (1985)). 
 341. Id. at 850 (describing the lack of injunctive relief sought by the federal government 
and bringing up the example of Oregon’s Fairview Training Center). 
 342. Id. at 853–54 (“The absence of provisions relating to the monitoring of placements is 
part of a bigger problem. . . .  [T]he decrees fail to provide for any independent monitoring 
body to ensure compliance; instead, they leave these responsibilities to the federal 
government.”). 
 343. Id. at 852. 
 344. See, e.g., Roger L. Faith et al., Antitrust Pork Barrel, 25 J.L. & ECON. 329 (1982) 
(arguing that the composition of a congressional oversight committee influenced the 
composition of an FTC antitrust law); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Continuing Innovation 
of Citizen Enforcement, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 185, 191 (showing how political considerations 
have lead agencies to reduce prosecution of environmental law violations). 
 345. Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Ambiguity and Symbolic Structures:  Organizational 
Mediation of Civil Rights Law, 97 AM. J. SOC. 1531, 1531 (1992). 
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enforcers like the DOJ, have the opportunity to transform ambiguity into 
procedure that limits the law’s impact on society.346 
B.  Improving the Response to Patterns or Practices of Police Misconduct 
This Article identified numerous possible problems with the DOJ’s 
enforcement of § 14141.  The DOJ’s case selection process appears messy 
and imprecise.  The case selection process also lacks transparency.  
Additionally, the DOJ has unevenly enforced § 14141 over the years based 
in part on changes in internal policies.  Enforcement of the statute appears 
limited, as the DOJ only has the resources for a small number of 
investigations per year.  And political spillover prevents the DOJ from 
aggressively pursuing structural police reform in all cases.  To overcome 
these problems, I make two normative recommendations. 
First, the DOJ should develop a more transparent case selection process 
that effectively puts police agencies on notice about the types of reforms 
that they ought to implement to avoid § 14141 action.  Other scholars like 
Professor Harmon have made similar calls for improvements in the § 14141 
case selection process.347  One way that that the DOJ could do this is by 
creating a national list of best practices each year, and prioritizing suits 
against departments that fail to implement these recommended policies. 
This solution would not only require the DOJ to develop a core set of best 
practices each year, it would also require the DOJ to collect data from all of 
the nation’s police agencies on whether the department currently employs 
certain best practices.  This would be a challenging, but hardly impossible 
feat.  The federal government already collects annual and semiannual data 
from the vast majority of local police agencies.348  This potential method 
for prioritizing litigation, though, would offer numerous advantages.  It 
could incentivize rational police departments to implement proactive 
reforms.349  Police executives that want to avoid potentially public and 
embarrassing structural police reform would have a clear blueprint of the 
 
 346. Organizational sociologists call this phenomenon in the private context the 
organizational mediation of the law. Id. at 1567 (explaining that in the context of equal 
employment opportunity and affirmative action laws, “where legal ambiguity, procedural 
constraints, and weak enforcement mechanisms leave the meaning of compliance open to 
organizational construction, organizations that are subject to normative pressure from their 
environment elaborate their formal structures to create visible symbols of their attention to 
law” that still may not honor the spirit of the law). 
 347. Professor Harmon persuasively suggested that the DOJ should announce an ordered 
list of problematic police agencies each year that could potentially be subject to litigation. 
Harmon, supra note 4, at 27. She then recommended that the DOJ investigate these 
departments in order, prioritizing the DOJ’s limited resources on departments at the top of 
the list. Id. 
 348. The DOJ is currently authorized to “collect and analyze statistical information about 
the operation of the justice system.” Id. at 30. 
 349. Id. at 23 (“According to deterrence theory, a rational actor will engage in conduct 
when doing so provides a positive expected return in light of the actor’s utility function . . . 
[meaning that] a police department will adopt remedial measures to prevent misconduct 
when doing so is a cost-effective means of reducing the net costs of police 
misconduct . . . .”). 
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kind of proactive policies they can implement to avoid federal intervention.  
Additionally, this approach would allow the DOJ to exert a continued and 
evolving influence over local police agencies as best practices change over 
time.  It could also increase the perceived legitimacy of future DOJ 
interventions into police agencies that lack these best practices.  To develop 
this annual list of best practices, the DOJ could coordinate with recognized 
law enforcement organizations.  This would be consistent with a growing 
movement within the DOJ to focus on collaborative police reform.350 
Second, given the apparent inability of the DOJ to consistently or 
aggressively utilize § 14141, policymakers should take steps to increase the 
number of structural police reform cases. One way that Congress could 
achieve this is by granting private litigants a limited equitable right of 
action against police departments engaged in a pattern or practice of 
unconstitutional misconduct.351 Some scholars have argued that granting 
such a private right of action would interfere with active public claims.352  
This is a reasonable concern.  In order to alleviate this concern, though, 
Congress could provide the attorney general with narrow authority to 
intervene and block private § 14141 claims against agencies where the DOJ 
has already initiated a public § 14141 investigation.  In theory, this statutory 
change would permit the DOJ to continue the important job of structurally 
reforming problematic police departments, while empowering a new group 
of plaintiffs to fill the gaps left by the DOJ’s historically uneven 
enforcement policies.  Congress considered this possibility in the original 
Police Accountability Act of 1991 and considered another bill that would 
do just this in 1999 and again in 2000.353  Such a private right of action 
would be “especially valuable when the reigning presidential 
administration’s financial and political commitment to § 14141 
 
 350. See, e.g., Sam Wood, The Federal Agent Scrutinizing the Philadelphia P.D., 
PHILLY.COM (Dec. 30, 2013, 4:34 PM), http://www.philly.com/philly/news/breaking/The_
fed_scrutinizing_the_Philadelphia_PD.html (discussing how Philadelphia, Las Vegas, and 
other cities are part of a collaborative police reform model with the DOJ that will potentially 
avoid the use of § 14141 and external monitoring). 
 351. At least one scholar has recommended a similar proposal in the past.  Professor 
Myriam Gilles has argued that, in light of the DOJ’s limited enforcement ability, Congress 
ought to amend § 14141 to allow the DOJ to deputize private citizens to bring public pattern 
or practice suits seeking injunctive relief. Gilles, supra note 14.  Gilles tempers her 
recommendation that the DOJ must formally deputize any private individual seeking 
§ 14141 relief. Id. at 1417.  She says that this deputation model thrives in other similar 
litigation contexts. Id. at 1418.  Scholars have also recognized that agencies often “lack the 
capacity to enforce the law adequately,” making private enforcement valuable in some 
contexts. Stephenson, supra note 323, at 107–09. 
 352. Harmon, supra note 4, at 63 (“[P]rivate suits would not only likely result in weaker 
reforms than government suits, but would effectively inhibit the [DOJ] from pursuing more 
effective reforms in the same departments in the future.”). 
 353. Id. at 58 (“[S]everal members of Congress introduced in 1999 and then again in 
2000 the Law Enforcement Trust and Integrity Act (LETIA) to amend § 14141 to allow any 
aggrieved person to bring a civil action for declaratory and injunctive relief for violations of 
the statute.”); see Law Enforcement Trust and Integrity Act of 2000, H.R. 3927, 106th Cong. 
§ 502; Law Enforcement Trust and Integrity Act of 1999, H.R. 2656, 106th Cong. § 501. 
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enforcement is low.”354  The evidence presented in this Article 
demonstrates that during a period of the Bush Administration, there 
appeared to be little commitment to § 14141.  In the absence of DOJ action, 
this statutory change would permit private individuals to fill the gaps during 
times of underenforcement.  Further, this would likely increase the number 
of total § 14141 claims brought against American police departments,355 as 
DOJ officials openly acknowledge that they cannot possibly litigate in most 
agencies where there may be a pattern or practice of misconduct.356  This 
change would empower civil rights groups to bring pattern or practice 
claims independently, rather than having to convince the DOJ that action is 
warranted.  One litigator commented that adding a private right of action to 
§ 14141 would “obviously be transformative.”357  This proposed change 
would also potentially overcome concerns about political cooptation of 
public rights of action and political spillover, as the power would be 
directly in the hands of private litigants to seek equitable action against 
local law enforcement agencies.358  But this approach would suffer from 
several drawbacks.  To begin with, private parties may “pursue a resolution 
to the § 14141 suit that maximizes their expected financial gain rather than 
a resolution that maximizes effective reform.”359  As Professor Harmon has 
argued, § 14141 claims could be used by private parties as leverage in 
§ 1983 cases.360  And such a grant of power to private litigants is 
 
 354. Harmon, supra note 4, at 59. 
 355. Cf. Interview #14, supra note 209, at 11. The participant explained in depth: 
I think that a private cause of action would obviously be transformative.  And I 
think if Congress was nervous about creating a private cause of action and thought 
that it’s too radical, that there would be ways to have some kind of gatekeeping 
function around the private cause of action.  I think that would be—there’s no way 
that the Justice Department can litigate all of the patterns and practices of police 
misconduct in this country.  There are too many policing jurisdictions for them to 
do that. 
Id. 
 356. Id. at 12 (stating that “[i]t’s just, it’s not plausible to think that the Justice 
Department can do this by itself” in arguing that the Special Litigation Section cannot 
possibly litigate all pattern or practice claims.) 
 357. Id. at 11. 
 358. Stephenson, supra note 323, at 110–12 (stating that “private enforcement is most 
associated with legislative distrust of the executive branch” and can potentially correct 
“agency slack”). 
 359. Harmon, supra note 4, at 60. 
 360. Id. at 59.  Harmon concludes that the availability of § 14141 remedies will make 
local municipalities 
more receptive partners for private actors seeking to maximize § 1983 awards:  
some public officials will seek to avoid intrusive reforms, even at the expense of 
financial payouts by the city, while some private actors will seek to maximize 
financial awards from the city, even at the expense of less reform.  In such cases, 
both parties would have reason to reach a settlement that avoids many best practice 
reforms.  Even private plaintiffs with good motives may be influenced by local 
agents intent on avoiding intrusion.  These incentives for collusion suggest that 
private suits are unlikely to produce results consistent with the public interest. 
Id. at 60. 
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constitutionally suspect after Lyons.361  In light of the potential 
shortcomings of a private right of action, policymakers may understandably 
look for other ways to increase the number of structural police reform cases.  
For instance, states legislatures could permit state attorneys general to 
initiate structural police reform in state court.  Professor Samuel Walker and 
Morgan Macdonald have recommended the addition of such a state-level 
structural police reform measure.362  Any state statute could roughly mirror 
§ 14141 and give state attorneys general the ability to bring suit against 
police departments within their state that are engaged in a pattern or 
practice of unconstitutional misconduct.  This could dramatically increase 
the number of structural police reform cases.  While state attorneys general 
may be susceptible to the same resource limitations, political cooptation, 
and political spillover effects evident in the federal government’s 
enforcement of § 14141, structural police reform initiated by state attorneys 
general may be more rigorous than reforms requested by private litigants. 
CONCLUSION 
Pattern or practice litigation represents a dramatically different avenue 
for police reform.  The initial enthusiasm for this potentially invasive form 
of federal regulation was understandable.  After all, § 14141 did not simply 
increase the cost of misconduct, but instead gave the attorney general the 
authority to forcefully bring about reform in problematic police 
departments.  At the time of passage, § 14141 represented perhaps the only 
legal mechanism capable of forcefully reorganizing and improving 
otherwise decentralized American policing agencies.  But the enthusiasm 
for this regulatory mechanism has justifiably waned, as enforcement has 
been weak and inconsistent.  The empirical results from this study are 
discouraging.  They remind us that, despite all of the optimism originally 
surrounding this measure, the only way that § 14141 can instigate proactive 
police reform is if the DOJ routinely enforces the measure.  The normative 
recommendations in this Article could potentially increase the number of 
§ 14141 claims and improve the transparency of the case selection process.  
These changes could ensure that § 14141 finally fulfills its potential as “the 
most promising legal mechanism” available to incentivize constitutional 
policing.363 
 
 361. Gilles, supra note 14, at 1414 (arguing that any attempt to grant a private right of 
action under § 14141 would face “insurmountable constitutional problems under the 
equitable standing rule of Lyons”). 
 362. See generally Walker & Macdonald, supra note 10, at 549 (“[T]he democratic 
process ensures that the public interest weighs heavily on the actions of each state attorney 
general.”). 
 363. Armacost, supra note 2, at 457. 
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APPENDIX A.  FORMAL STRUCTURAL POLICE REFORM INVESTIGATIONS 
INITIATED BY THE DOJ 





5/1/1995 9/14/1998   Torrance CA 
Adelanto Police 
Department 












4/15/1996 3/23/2004 5/14/2010 New Orleans LA 
New Jersey State 
Police 
4/15/1996 10/26/2009   Newark NJ 
Illinois State 
Police 














8/12/1996 11/14/2000   Beverly Hills CA 





8/21/1997 12/23/2004   Brooklyn NY 
Buffalo Police 
Department 
12/9/1997 7/9/2008   Buffalo NY 
Columbus Police 
Department 










1/31/1999 2/10/2012   Washington, 
D.C. 
 





3/17/1999 3/31/2005   Bronx NY 
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3/31/1999 11/12/2003   Charleston WV 
Riverside Police 
Department 





























5/7/2001 4/12/2007   Cincinnati OH 
Detroit Police 
Department 




4/4/2002 1/9/2013   Schenectady NY 
Portland Police 
Department 
5/6/2002 6/27/2005   Portland ME 
Miami Police 
Department 




12/11/2002 3/26/2008   Providence RI 
Villa Rica Police 
Department 
1/27/2003 12/23/2006   Villa Rica GA 
Alabaster Police 
Department 













8/3/2004     Beacon NY 
Warren Police 
Department 
11/29/2004     Warren OH 
Easton Police 
Department 
10/14/2005     Easton PA 
Orange County 
Sheriff’s Office 
1/10/2007 4/4/2013   Orlando FL 
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5/25/2007 5/27/2011   Austin TX 
Yonkers Police 
Department 




4/30/2008     San Juan PR 
Harvey Police 
Department 
9/5/2008 1/24/2012   Harvey IL 
Lorain Police 
Department 








3/10/2009     Phoenix AZ 
Inglewood Police 
Department 












6/2/2010     Graham NC 
Seattle Police 
Department 
3/31/2011     Seattle WA 
Newark Police 
Department 
5/9/2011     Newark NJ 
Portland Police 
Department 
6/7/2011     Portland OR 
Meridian Police 
Department  
11/29/2011     Meridian MS 
Missoula Police 
Department 
4/25/2012     Missoula MT 
University of 
Montana Office 
of Public Safety 




11/27/2012     Albuquerque NM 
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APPENDIX B.  NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENTS BETWEEN DOJ AND POLICE 
AGENCIES 
Agency Agreement Date Close Date Monitor 
Pittsburgh Police Department 4/16/1997 6/16/2005 Yes 
Steubenville Police Department 9/3/1997 3/3/2005 Yes 
New Jersey State Police 12/29/1999 10/26/2009 Yes 
District of Columbia 
Metropolitan Police Department 
6/13/2001 2/10/2008 Yes 
Los Angeles Police Department  6/15/2001 5/16/2013 Yes 
Highland Park Police 
Department 
7/11/2001 12/7/2004 No 
Cincinnati Police Department 4/12/2002 4/12/2007 Yes 
Columbus Police Department 9/4/2002 5/14/2004 No 
Buffalo Police Department 9/19/2002 7/8/2008 No 
Mount Prospect Police 
Department 
1/22/0203 12/28/2006 No 
Detroit Police Department (1) 6/12/2003   Yes 
Detroit Police Department (2) 7/18/2003 12/23/2006 Yes 
Villa Rica Police Department 12/23/2003 12/23/2006 No 
Prince George’s County Police 
Department (1) 
1/22/2004 3/15/2005 Yes 
Cleveland Division of Police 2/11/2004 3/15/2005 No 
Prince George’s County Police 
Department (2) 
3/11/2004 3/12/2007 Yes 
Virgin Islands Police 
Department 
3/23/2009   Yes 
Easton Police Department 9/8/2010   No 
Orange County Sheriff’s Office 9/16/2010 4/4/2013 No 
Beacon Police Department 12/23/2010   No 
Warren Police Department 1/26/2012   No 
Seattle Police Department 9/21/2012   Yes 
East Haven Police Department 12/21/2012   Yes 
New Orleans Police Department 1/11/2013   Yes 
 
